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THE SECTION 1983 ACTION
COMMON LAW ELEMENTS OF THE SECTION 1983 ACTION
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the role of the common law in Supreme
Court interpretation and application of § 1983, which grants a cause of
action for violations of constitutional rights committed "under color of
any [state] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage."' I argue
that the common law has served primarily to narrow the reach of
§ 1983, and that this is inappropriate in light of the broad statutory
language and the absence of good evidence that the enacting Congress
intended a narrower application than the statutory language indicates.
The controversy over the influence of common law on § 1983 is
reflective of a deeper conflict regarding whether the § 1983 remedy
should be available even when state law would provide an adequate
remedy. This issue appears in different forms. In Monroe v. Pape it
was presented as whether action in violation of state law was nonethe-
less action under color of state law.2 In later cases, it was presented as
the question whether due process was violated by an official's tortious
conduct when a state remedy is available.3 The more interpretive
breadth the Court grants to § 1983, the less relevant state law becomes
to whether a § 1983 action is available.
Despite the plausibility of some of the arguments against a broad
§ 1983 remedy when state remedies exist, I am not convinced that the
Court's use of the common law to limit § 1983 is defensible. While
there have undoubtedly been some very expansive applications of
§ 1983 and other Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes, the statutes
have not been allowed to reach their full textual potential, largely be-
cause the Court has constructed numerous limiting doctrines, many of
which have the common law as their primary doctrinal material.4
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Section 1983 was originally part of section 1 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1871. See id.
2. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.
658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that cities were not persons subject to § 1983 liability).
Not all members of the Court accept the Monroe rule. As recently as 1994, two members of the
Supreme Court argued against recognizing a due process claim in a § 1983 suit "where an injury
has been caused not by a state law, policy, or procedure, but by a random and unauthorized act
that can be remedied by state law." Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 819 (1994) (Kennedy, J.
joined by Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment).
3. See Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113 (1990); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984);
Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986).
4. For general background on § 1983 and other Reconstruction-era civil rights provisions,
including many of the issues discussed in this introduction, see Jack M. Beermann, A Critical
Approach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to Sources of Law, 42 STAN. L. REv. 51 (1989)
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Overall, the Court's methodology in interpreting and applying
the Reconstruction-era civil rights statutes has been highly oriented
toward legislative intent and policy, with the common law playing an
important role. In discerning legislative intent, the Court has looked
to the debates in Congress, and has also presumed that Congress in-
tended to incorporate well-established common law rules that were in
operation at the time the statutes were passed into the causes of ac-
tion created by the statutes. Thus, the common law has been an im-
portant source of norms for filling gaps in the statute and for shaping
the contours of the § 1983 cause of action. Under this approach, back-
ground common law rules have provided immunity defenses in § 1983
actions, and other common law rules have filled gaps in the § 1983's
remedial and other provisions, often with restrictive results.
The principal policy concerns underlying the application of § 1983
in recent years have been the fear that government officials will be
timid or distracted in performing their duties as a result of excessive
civil rights liability and the ensuing litigation. Based on these con-
cerns, the Court has made it more difficult for plaintiffs to force litiga-
tion beyond the pre-trial stage and more difficult for plaintiffs
ultimately to prevail on the merits. These interpretive devices and the
policy concerns have significantly narrowed the reach of § 1983, espe-
cially when considered in light of the very broad textual features of
the statute.
By contrast, in other areas, most notably administrative law, the
Supreme Court has embarked on a new textualist mode of statutory
interpretation that appears designed to prevent Congress and govern-
ment agencies from moving in regulatory directions the Court finds
unwise or inconsistent with the Court majority's ideological views. 5 In
his survey of the 1994 Term's statutory cases, Professor Peter Strauss
notes that this textualist methodology has not been applied to the Re-
construction-era civil rights statutes. 6 In those cases, the Court has
employed a more holistic approach, in which common law, statute,
and policy work together to create a body of doctrine. Although Pro-
[hereinafter Beermann, Critical Approach], and Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Court's Nar-
row View on Civil Rights, 1993 Sup. Cr. REV. 199 [hereinafter Beermann, Narrow View].
5. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., The Supreme Court's New Hypertextualism: An Invitation to
Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative State, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 749, 749-52 (1995).
Professor Pierce posits several possible explanations for what he calls the Court's "new
hypertextualism," but he appears to find most plausible those related to the pursuance of a
conservative agenda. See id. at 779-81. See also Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of
Statute and Common Law, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 429, 429-31.
6. See Strauss, supra note 5, at 447-49.
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fessor Strauss appears to long for the extension of this more holistic
approach to other areas, the holistic approach has had the same effect
in the civil rights area as textualism has in other areas: frustrating con-
gressional intent and narrowing the domain of the statutes.
It should not be surprising that a conservative Court would not
engage in textualist application of § 1983. A textualist interpretation
of § 1983 would not advance a conservative agenda given that § 1983
is broadly drawn with few apparent internal limitations.7 Textualism,
therefore, would greatly expand its reach and afford federal remedies
for a wide spectrum of public conduct. Section 1983 provides a cause
of action against "[e]very person" who, acting under color of state law,
violates rights guaranteed by the federal Constitution and laws.8 Us-
ing its various nontextual interpretive devices, the Court, has, inter
alia, narrowed the class of persons liable for violations, narrowed the
scope of actionable violations, and restricted the remedies available
for violations. While it is unlikely that fresh historical analysis or legal
argument will persuade the Supreme Court to reexamine its doctrines
and apply Reconstruction-era statutes in a broader, more receptive
manner, it would be appropriate for the Court to abandon its common
law baseline and develop a federal policy-based mode of interpreta-
tion for Reconstruction-era civil rights provisions including § 1983.
In a recent development that is examined closely here, the Court
held that a plaintiff suing under § 1983 has no cause of action unless
he can plead and prove the elements of the common law cause of
action most closely analogous to his civil rights claim.9 This use of the
common law runs counter to the prevailing view that the § 1983 action
is largely independent of the existence of common law remedies for
the conduct involved. Now it appears that the § 1983 remedy may not
be available unless there is also a common law remedy in a particular
situation.
7. One significant textual issue is the proper interpretation of the "under color of" require-
ment for § 1983 liability. In Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 170 (1961), overruled in part by
Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the Supreme Court rejected a narrow
interpretation of this clause that would have limited § 1983 liability to officially sanctioned con-
duct. The Court instead accepted the argument that an official acting within the scope of his or
her employment acts under color of state law even when the official violates state law in the
course of carrying official responsibilities. See id. at 184-85. To one who believes that the
Monroe Court misread the text of § 1983, correct textualist reading of § 1983 would narrow the
reach of the statute rather than expand it. See Eric H. Zagrans, "Under Color of" What Law: A
Reconstructed Model of Section 1983 Liability, 71 VA. L. REv. 499, 503 (1985).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
9. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994).
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This Article proceeds as follows. In the next part, I address gen-
erally the influence of common law in civil rights litigation. First, I
look at the justifications for common law influence and, second, I ex-
amine the different types of issues for which common law is important
in § 1983 cases. This part also includes an extensive look at Heck v.
Humphrey, which I characterize as potentially a major new develop-
ment in § 1983 doctrine that could significantly curtail the availability
of the § 1983 action. This discussion includes an exploration of the
merits of Heck's ruling, a discussion of the possible effects of the Heck
analysis on other § 1983 litigation, and a proposed alternative analysis
that would reach the same result as Heck without the potential side-
effects. Finally, I look at another way in which the common law ef-
fects the § 1983 action: the influence of common law concepts on con-
stitutional interpretation.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF COMMON LAw IN CIVIL RIGHTs LITIGATION
A. The Justifications for Relying on Common Law
The Supreme Court's use of common law as an interpretive base-
line in civil rights litigation, especially under § 1983, has been detailed
in academic commentary several times,' 0 and the main points need
recounting here only briefly. The Reconstruction-era civil rights stat-
utes are not detailed codes but rather supply only the basic elements
of the actions they create. Courts are called upon to fill in the details
on many issues, including proper parties, causation, standards of care,
remedies, and more. Because some civil rights statutes create actions
against local governments and government officials, unique issues
arise, including official and entity immunities, notice of claim provi-
sions, exhaustion of administrative remedies, and the relationship be-
tween the statutes and the Constitution.
The Court has held that courts should look to common law prin-
ciples, found in the general provisions of Reconstruction-era and cur-
rent common law, along with textual and policy analysis, to fill in the
details of civil rights actions. The Court relies on two related theories
to justify looking to Reconstruction-era common law. The first is that
unless the converse was specified, the enacting Congress intended to
incorporate well-established common law principles into the cause of
action it was creating. The second is that Congress had, as its global
intent for § 1983, the creation of a "species of tort liability," so that
10. See, e.g., Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, and sources cited therein.
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established tort law doctrines should be incorporated. The Court jus-
tifies looking to current common law under the theory that the enact-
ing Congress did not intend to freeze the evolution of the civil rights
actions and require federal courts to perpetuate outdated, abandoned,
common law doctrines."
Statutory authority exists for employing common law doctrines to
fill gaps in Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation. In the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, Congress directed the federal district courts, when
exercising their jurisdiction under the Civil Rights statutes, that when
federal law is inadequate to "furnish suitable remedies," they should
apply "the common law, as modified and changed by the constitution
and statutes" of the state in which the district court sits.12 This provi-
sion might justify importing common law concepts into civil rights liti-
gation. However, the Court does not rely upon this statute when
incorporating common law concepts and, without explanation, does
not apply it except in exceedingly narrow contexts. 13
The Court has not decided every important § 1983 issue with ref-
erence to the common law, and it has not discussed how it chooses
when to use the common law and when not to do so. The Court often
decides cases based upon the statutory language, history, and policies,
without reference to common law. For example, the Court has not
incorporated the common law of vicarious liability into § 1983 actions
against local governments, first holding that municipalities were not
proper defendants in § 1983 actions' 4 and later holding that munici-
palities could be held liable, but only for violations caused by munici-
pal policy or custom.' 5 These decisions were based on the Court's
reading of the text and history of § 1983 and not on the underlying
11. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 39-41, 48-49 (1983) (applying both 1871 and contempo-
rary common law to create remedies doctrines in § 1983 cases); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
255-59 (1978).
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994). For a discussion of this and other related statutory provi-
sions, see Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, at 57-65.
13. See Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, at 58. The Court has relied upon the
Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994), to apply the state common law of preclusion to
decide what effect a prior state court judgment will have on subsequent federal civil rights litiga-
tion. See Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-81 (1984).
14. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Depart-
ment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
15. See Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 688-91 (1978). Vicarious liability
existed in the common law of the nineteenth century and it continues in existence today. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 69 (5th ed. 1984).
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common law rule of vicarious liability which may have pointed in the
other direction. 1
6
The policies underlying § 1983 and litigation against governments
and government officials generally have also been important in other
controversies. Policy was the primary factor relied upon for the
Court's decision that § 1983 preempts state notice of claim statutes,
which require notice to government entities before they may be
sued. 17 The Court's decision to enforce contracts in which arrestees
trade their right to bring a civil rights action challenging their arrests
in exchange for a prosecutor's agreement not to prosecute, was also
based largely on policy grounds.'8 The Court referred to the common
law only for the general proposition that "promise[s are] unenforce-
able if the interest in [their] enforcement is outweighed in the circum-
stances by a public policy harmed by enforcement of the
agreement."'19 The Court did not discuss specifically whether such
agreements would be unenforceable under common law standards or
whether they were enforceable as a matter of common law during the
Reconstruction era. The Court instead relied heavily on policies
favoring enforcement, including its impression that not "all [§ 1983
suits] are meritorious. Many are marginal and some are frivolous...
[and] the burden of defending such lawsuits is substantial. '"20
Further, the Court's treatment of state statutes of limitations
shows an unwillingness to cede control over important decisions re-
garding § 1983 even when state law clearly governs an issue. The
Court has held that state statutes of limitations apply under traditional
principles to § 1983 actions. However, the Court has not allowed state
law to govern the characterization of the action for purposes of select-
ing the appropriate state statute.21 Some subsidiary doctrines, such as
tolling, are decided with reference to state law while others, such as
accrual of the cause of action, are decided as matters of federal law.22
16. There may have been a competing common law tradition of immunity, but the impor-
tant point is that the Court did not look to common law but rather focused on the history, text,
and policies underlying § 1983. See Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 837-38 (1985) (Ste-
vens, J. dissenting) (discussing applicability of common law of respondeat superior). See also
Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 74 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that respondeat superior is not proper
basis for individual liability in § 1983 case; defendant official must be personally involved in
violation to be held liable).
17. See Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
18. See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 395.
21. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 268-71 (1985).
22. See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 483-86 (1980) (tolling); Delaware State
College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-59 (1980) (accrual).
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The Court has also generally scrutinized state statutes of limitations to
ensure that their application would not undercut the policies underly-
ing § 1983.23 The Court has not allowed unreasonably short or dis-
criminatory statutes of limitations to undermine the viability of the
§ 1983 action.
Thus, when the Court relies upon common law to decide issues
that arise under § 1983, it justifies doing so with a theory of legislative
intent. But when the Court does not rely upon common law, it has
not explained why the common law does not apply to the issue at
hand. This makes it difficult to take seriously the Court's justification
for using common law when it does.
The common law also affects § 1983 litigation through its effect
on constitutional law. The Court has long looked to the common law
for guidance in interpreting and applying constitutional norms, and it
appears that this may have increased in recent years.24 The Court's
apparent justification for looking to the common law in constitutional
decision-making is similar to its reasoning for doing so in § 1983 litiga-
tion: the Framers of the Constitution looked to the common law as the
primary source of legal norms and intended that constitutional provi-
sions be read to incorporate common law norms where sensible.
B. The Types of Issues for Which Common Law
Provides Guidance
1. Interpretation of Section 1983
The Supreme Court has looked to common law concepts for gui-
dance in § 1983 cases since the action first became viable in the late
1950s and early 1960s. In Monroe v. Pape, the Supreme Court finally
promised that the cause of action created by Congress ninety years
earlier would be available.25 The Court, in Monroe, relied on general
common law principles of responsibility to reject a willfulness require-
ment for § 1983 actions.26 The Court stated that it would be inappro-
priate to impose a state of mind requirement derived from the
criminal law and stated that "Section [1983] should be read against the
23. See Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 59 (1984) (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
24. See, e.g., Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995) (looking to common law for gui-
dance on scope of fourth amendment).
25. See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History" The-
ory of Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REv. 737, 744-47.
26. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of
Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). See generally Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MIcH.
L. REv. 5, 14-21 (1980).
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background of tort liability that makes a man responsible for the natu-
ral consequences of his actions. '27
The overall effect of the incorporation of common law into Re-
construction-era civil rights actions is mixed, with some references ex-
panding liability and some contracting it. While in Monroe, the
reference to tort law was employed to broaden the scope of § 1983
liability, later common law references have often narrowed its scope.
For example, soon after Monroe, the Court ruled that § 1983's crea-
tion of liability for all "persons" did not override well-established
common law immunities enjoyed by government officials, the main
group of "persons" likely to be sued under § 1983.28 Thus, the impor-
tation, of common law immunities into § 1983 has substantially nar-
rowed its reach, which may be the overall effect of common law on
§ 1983.29
The conflicting effects of using common law in § 1983 cases re-
flects a deeper conflict over the proper application of civil rights stat-
utes. This conflict, while apparent in many areas, is illustrated quite
well by the relationship between § 1983 and the common law. On the
side of broader liability is the notion that enforcement of constitu-
tional rights is more important to our society than enforcement of
common law rights because constitutional rights are basic to the main-
tenance of our form of limited, democratic government. That is why
Congress passed the civil rights acts of the Reconstruction-era and
why civil rights cases were granted a federal forum. Congress found
enforcement of these rights so important that it granted plaintiffs the
option of a federal forum even when the defendant could prove that
an equally effective remedy was available in state court. Common law
doctrines, under this characterization, should not seriously limit the
27. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 187.
28. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-57 (1967), discussed in Beermann, Narrow View,
supra note 4, at 203 n.21.
29. It is interesting, in this regard, to observe the evolution of the importance the Court has
ascribed to § 1983's similarity to tort remedies. It has become commonplace to refer to § 1983 as
a "species of tort." See, e.g., Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 483 (1994). Originally, the "spe-
cies of tort liability" language was used in an argument to distinguish § 1983 from other species
of tort liability and against immunities which might exist in other species. See Imbler v.
Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 417 (1976) ("The statute thus creates a species of tort liability that on its
face admits of no immunities, and some have argued that it should be applied as stringently as it
reads. But that view has not prevailed.") Imbler appears to be the earliest use of the "species of
tort liability" characterization, and the phrase was quickly cited as a reason for treating § 1983
like other species. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 253 (1978). By the time of the Heck
decision, it had become axiomatic that the "species of tort liability" characterization means that
§ 1983 should look, as much as possible, like other species of tort liablity. See Heck, 512 U.S. at
483.
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availability of the civil rights action but might help fill gaps when nec-
essary. The fact that § 1983 creates a species of tort liability does not
necessarily mean that it should share traits with other species.
The contrary view argues that the recognition of constitutional
rights against governments and government officials is a serious mat-
ter, and presents more danger of intrusion on local preferences than
the common law. Therefore, it is argued that caution should be the
watchword, and traditional common law limitations should be main-
tained to safeguard against unneeded intrusions. This view counsels
that the constitutionally-based action should be available only under
extreme circumstances, 30 and only when no other effective remedy is
available. The existence of common law remedies means to propo-
nents of this view that civil rights litigation is often unnecessary and
should be avoided when common law remedies would be sufficient.
This view sees § 1983 as having been passed to combat serious viola-
tions but not isolated tort-like misconduct.
Each of these models has influenced different majorities of the
Supreme Court at different times, although given the broad statutory
language, nontextualist judicial doctrine has been more limiting than
expansive. Common law influence has been felt on several different
types of issues.31 First, common law concepts have been used to fill
obvious gaps in § 1983, supplying content to barren statutory terms.
In this category, I place causation, parties, and remedies. While each
of these issues is mentioned in the statute,32 the statute provides very
little detail on them and courts have looked to common law principles
to flesh them out. Second, common law concepts have been employed
to limit § 1983 in ways that are outside the statute and perhaps even
inconsistent with it. The primary example of this is immunity, which is
not hinted at in the text of any civil rights statute, but which has been
held by the Court to apply because it was so well-established in the
common law of the Reconstruction era. Third, in a new development,
under the theory that § 1983 creates a common law type of action, the
Court has required a plaintiff making a § 1983 claim to prove the ele-
ments of an analogous common law claim. Fourth, common law ex-
30. Hence the effort to confine § 1983 cases to "abuses of power" which the Supreme Court
rejected in Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 119 (1992).
31. My typology here is essentially similar to that first stated in Whitman, supra note 26, at
15.
32. Causation ("subjects or causes to be subjected") and parties ("person") are mentioned
explicitly in § 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). Remedies, including damages and injunctions, are




erts a great deal of influence on constitutional decision-making and,
insofar as a civil rights action is brought to enforce the Constitution,
the common law elements of constitutional law become important to
civil rights cases.
In the first category, common law concepts filling gaps in § 1983,
the Court has by and large rejected the expansive view of § 1983 and
employed common law to confine civil rights litigation within the
bounds of traditional common law litigation. The best examples of
this are damages rules, both compensatory and punitive. The Court
has not accepted arguments favoring substantial damages to recognize
the abstract value of the rights involved; further, it has rejected aug-
mentation of damages simply because constitutional rights have been
violated. Prevailing plaintiffs in civil rights cases are compensated
only for those injuries that would be compensable in a common law
action and the measure of damages is basically the same measure that
would apply in a common law action. 33 Regarding punitive damages,
the majority of the Court settled on a relatively liberal standard for
awarding punitive damages, but the argument was largely over which
measure had the best common law pedigree, and not over whether the
nature of the civil rights claim demanded that the more liberal stan-
dard be adopted.
The Court's heavy use of common law standards in § 1983 cases is
open to attack as inconsistent with the role of a court deciding a mat-
ter of statutory law. Arguably, the Court should focus on statutory
policy and not on the common law background. This argument denies
the Court's reliance on the common law background as within the in-
tent of Congress and instead views the Court as engaged in a statutory
interpretation/policymaking enterprise. Generally, this is legitimate
criticism. However, a close reading of the relevant opinions reveals
that the Court has taken statutory policy into account and has not
blindly adopted the common law rule. Simply put, the Court has not
adopted an expansive version of the policies advanced by the statutes.
It is understandable and, perhaps, inevitable that a statute creat-
ing a tort-like cause of action would be construed in line with common
law concepts on issues like damages and causation. These issues must
be addressed and the common law is a familiar and respected source
for guidance. However, the less the Court considers statutory policy
the less legitimate its focus on common law appears, unless one is very
33. See Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 306 (1986); Carey v.
Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978).
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sure that Congress intended the common law to be the primary refer-
ence. When the Court decides an issue primarily upon the weight of
nineteenth century authority, it misses the point that principles under-
lying § 1983 should be the primary source of guidance on matters not
fully addressed in the statutory language.
The second category of doctrines that the Court has employed
involve issues that are not mentioned in § 1983. The best examples of
these are statutes of limitations and official immunities. These doc-
trines share two important features. First, the statute arguably could
function without them. Second, they serve to limit the availability of
the § 1983 action. They are dissimilar, however, in that limitations
provisions, while part of state tort law, are statutory creations rather
than common law doctrines. Nonetheless, because they are borrowed
from state law, it is useful to think of them along with common law
doctrines such as immunities.
The Court has created a standard for incorporating these doc-
trines that are not express or implied in the text of § 1983. The Court
has stated that only doctrines that are "universally familiar" or "indis-
pensable prerequisites to litigation" are incorporated, under the the-
ory that Congress must have intended them to apply.34 Immunities
are placed in the former category and statutes of limitation in the
latter.
The Court has held that § 1983 cannot function properly without
a limitations period, thus making a limitations period indispensable. 35
Although an action brought long after the events would be possible to
pursue, practical difficulties for the parties certainly increase with the
passage of time. Further, in adopting state personal injury limitations
periods for § 1983 actions,36 the Court relies upon § 1988's direction
to employ local law where federal law is deficient. There is an estab-
lished tradition of federal courts appropriating state limitations peri-
ods for federal statutory actions that contain no limitations period. 37
With the enactment of a general federal statute of limitations, how-
ever, that tradition has become less important.38
34. Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 140 (1988).
35. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 271 (1985).
36. See id. at 268-71. State law governs the length of the limitations period. See id. at 269.
Federal law developed under § 1983 governs the characterization of the § 1983 action for the
purpose of selecting the appropriate state limitations period. See id. at 268-69.
37. See Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, at 63-64 n.83.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1994). The statute applies only to federal statutes passed after its
effective date. See id.
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There are other important issues for which the Court has long
looked to the common law for guidance. Professor Whitman men-
tions causation, compensable injury, and state of mind as elements of
§ 1983 actions that courts have defined using common law.39 Causa-
tion and injury are mentioned in the statute. The Court's use of com-
mon law for them is understandable since it would be difficult for the
action to function without judicial interpretation of them, and the
common law is the most obvious source of guidance.
With regard to state of mind as a common law element of § 1983
actions, Professor Whitman is correct that the Supreme Court's initial
reference to the common law in connection with § 1983 was to reject a
criminal law-type state of mind requirement for § 1983 actions and
adopt a tort-like rule of liability. In Monroe v. Pape, the Court wrote:
"Section [1983] should be read against the background of tort liability
that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences of his ac-
tions."'40 That passage, which rejects a willfulness requirement for
§ 1983 cases, is the genesis of the characterization of § 1983 as a spe-
cies of tort liability. However, it is inaccurate to state that the Court
has constructed a state of mind element for § 1983 actions out of com-
mon law concepts. In fact, the Court has very clearly rejected a state
of mind requirement for § 1983 actions and, instead, has held that
§ 1983 itself contains no state of mind requirement. 41
The wholesale importation of common law immunities into fed-
eral civil rights law stands on different footing. The Court has not
held that the absence of immunities in § 1983 renders it deficient so
that it is necessary under § 1988 to look to state law to fill the "gap" in
§ 1983's provisions. Section 1983 functions without immunities. The
absence of immunities does not affect the practical utility of § 1983,
make the claim more difficult to pursue, or present a gap that must be
filled one way or the other. The Court relies upon its presumption
that Congress would have directly spoken to the issue had it intended
to abrogate well-established common law immunities in § 1983.
It is difficult to evaluate, from this distance in time, the merits of
the Court's analysis. The statute gives no indication that Congress in-
tended immunities to apply, and its use of "every person" in its speci-
fication of defendants appears to contemplate liability for all violators,
39. See Whitman, supra note 26, at 17-18.
40. 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
41. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986), discussed in SH-LDON H. NAHMOD ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 12
(1995).
[Vol. 72:695
THE SECTION 1983 ACTION
not only that small group of potential violators not protected by a
common law immunity. The legislative debates shed little light on the
issue, although the potential liability of judges, a category of official
that receives absolute immunity from damages under current doctrine,
appears to have been within Congress's contemplation.4 2 The deci-
sion turns on where one places the burden of persuasion. If one
places the burden on the proponents of immunities to prove they were
preserved, one could argue that, if immunities were universal, it might
be expected that Members of Congress would have mentioned them
either in the legislation or at least during floor debates. The oppo-
nents of the legislation might have taken comfort in the fact that the
statutes would be less effective given the widespread existence of im-
munity. There is no evidence that they did.
Even more interesting is the Court's abandonment of the com-
mon law as it has shaped the contours of the immunities.4 3 The fea-
tures of the immunities have changed dramatically since they were
first recognized under the Court's common law doctrine. 44 While the
Court has employed common law standards to determine whether an
official is entitled to an absolute or a qualified immunity, the doctrinal
features of the immunities, especially qualified immunity, have been
altered dramatically without regard to the common law. For example,
without regard to the common law, the Court removed the subjective
element of the qualified immunity45 and decided that absolute judicial
immunity from damages did not shield judges from attorneys' fees
awards when equitable relief was awarded against a judge.4 6
Qualified immunity is available to almost every official not enti-
tled to absolute immunity. The subjective element of qualified immu-
nity meant that a plaintiff could overcome the immunity by showing
that the defendant acted with malice toward the victim of the constitu-
tional violation. Removing the subjective element means that the
only way to overcome the qualified immunity is for the plaintiff to
show that the defendant violated a "clearly established ... constitu-
42. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 540-41 (1984) (concluding judges are among persons
amenable to § 1983 action and discussing legislative history regarding judges as § 1983
defendants).
43. 1 have previously made this point in Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, at 67-
70.
44. See Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 372 (1951); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55
(1967).
45. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982) (removing subjective element of
qualified immunity in a Bivens action against a federal official); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335,
345 (1986) (applying Harlow's reformulation of the qualified immunity in a § 1983 action).
46. See Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 524-25 (1984).
1997]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
tional right[] of which a reasonable person would have known. '47
There is no common law basis for this change, although there may
also have been no common law basis for the subjective element in the
first place. It was made purely as a matter of statutory policy, which
may be a preferable form of decision-making but is inconsistent with
the historical, common law basis for the immunities.
The third type of interface between § 1983 and the common law
involves potential overlap between the elements of common law torts
and § 1983 actions.48 Throughout the post-Monroe period, many is-
sues have presented themselves in the form of the question whether a
particular tort, when committed by a government official, is a constitu-
tional violation or gives rise to a § 1983 claim. There are many torts,
such as false imprisonment and malicious prosecution, that are likely
to be committed by government officials because government officials
commonly engage in the conduct involved. All torts, however, pres-
ent similar issues since government officials often engage in conduct
that can give rise to claims such as defamation, assault, battery, and
even simple claims for negligent property damage or personal injury.
Thus, the question arises whether victims of such torts have constitu-
tional claims or whether they are relegated to state tort actions.
Plaintiffs in these official tort cases usually base their claim on
due process, arguing that whatever injuries they suffered deprived
them of liberty or property without due process of law, since no hear-
ing was held before the injury was inflicted. For the more common,
less government-oriented torts, the Court has rejected the claim that
such torts automatically violate the Constitution. For example, the
Court held that ordinary defamation committed by a government offi-
cial is not a deprivation of liberty unless some interest in addition to
the plaintiff's simple interest in an unblemished reputation is dam-
aged.49 With regard to negligent injuries to property or person, the
Court first held that negligence torts were constitutional violations
only if the state did not provide an adequate remedy.50 The Court
subsequently further restricted the availability of constitutional claims
47. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
48. The most recent incarnation of this issue, the Heck doctrine, is discussed in depth in the
next sub-section. See infra text accompanying notes 54-57.
49. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693,701-02 (1976). The Court held that the plaintiff does not
make out a claim for a constitutional violation unless he alleges an injury in addition to the
damage to his reputation, such as loss of employment opportunities or loss of the ability to enter
places of business, due to the stigma created by the defamation. See id.
50. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327 (1986).
[Vol. 72:695
THE SECTION 1983 ACTION
over negligence torts when it held that merely negligent conduct did
not amount to a deprivation under the Fourteenth Amendment and,
thus, could not give rise to a due process claim.51
The more government-oriented torts present a different sort of
problem because they appear to address conduct that, when per-
formed by a government official, would violate constitutional rights.
For example, although the issue has not been decided, it seems natural
to suppose that malicious prosecution by a government official who
participates in a prosecution without probable cause 5 2 violates the
Constitution. False imprisonment, perhaps by keeping an innocent
person (or a person whose sentence has expired) in prison, also seems
to be a natural candidate for constitutional condemnation. I have
written elsewhere that the Court has not been successful in its attempt
to distinguish torts that give rise to constitutional claims from those
that do not.5 3 However, the Court appears to recognize that there is a
category of government-oriented common law torts that are closely
analogous to constitutional violations.
2. Heck v. Humphrey: Elements of the Section 1983 Action
a. The Heck Issue: Should State Prisoners be Able to Seek
Damages for Allegedly Unconstitutional Convictions?
The best example of a tort that looks like a constitutional viola-
tion when committed by a government official is the recent case, Heck
v. Humphrey.54 That case was brought by a state prisoner, Roy Heck,
who had been convicted of involuntary manslaughter. 55 He sued two
prosecutors and a state police investigator, alleging that they had com-
mitted a variety of constitutional violations that ultimately contrib-
uted to his conviction.5 6 These allegations resemble the common law
torts of malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Heck sought only
money damages and did not ask for an order releasing him from state
prison.5 7 Had Heck sought release, his claim would have been barred
because it would have been construed as a petition for habeas corpus
51. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328 (1986).
52. The actual prosecutor would be immune from damages, but others, such as the police
officers making the arrest, might not be immune.
53. See Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism
and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 277, 305-07 (1988) (criticizing the analysis in
Paul, 424 U.S. 693).
54. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
55. See id. at 478.




and Heck had not exhausted all his claims as required before a state
prisoner can seek federal habeas relief.58 The Court in Preiser v. Rod-
riguez, in dicta, clearly stated that the habeas exhaustion requirement
had no effect on damages actions. 5
9
The Heck Court, in an opinion written by Justice Scalia, ulti-
mately rejected the Preiser dicta and held that a damages action for an
unconstitutional conviction may not be brought unless and until the
state prisoner establishes that the criminal proceeding was terminated
in favor of the accused or that the conviction was held unlawful or
expunged in some forum or by some official.60 This is not an exhaus-
tion requirement because, even if all claims are fully exhausted, if the
conviction has been upheld and the conviction remains valid, the pris-
oner may not bring a damages action that challenges the conviction.
The Court cited powerful policies against allowing tort actions that
amount to collateral attacks on convictions, 61 but the route to its con-
clusion warrants close examination.
The Court, as noted, acknowledged that Preiser was not control-
ling since the plaintiff was not seeking release from prison. The Court,
after arguing that no prior case had granted damages for an unconsti-
tutional conviction and that its no exhaustion rule for § 1983 cases was
not implicated, turned to the relationship between § 1983 and tort law
principles. The Court recited the familiar adage that § 1983 "creates a
species of tort liability"62 and in the following paragraphs, broke sig-
nificant new ground regarding the relationship between § 1983 and
tort law:
"We have repeatedly noted that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 creates a spe-
cies of tort liability." [citation omitted]. "[O]ver the centuries the
common law of torts has developed a set of rules to implement the
principle that a person should be compensated fairly for injuries
caused by the violation of his legal rights. These rules, defining the
elements of damages and the prerequisites for their recovery, pro-
vide the appropriate starting point for the inquiry under § 1983 as
well." [citation omitted]. Thus, to determine whether there is any
bar to the present suit, we look first to the common law of torts.63
The common-law cause of action for malicious prosecution pro-
vides the closest analogy to claims of the type considered here be-
58. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973), discussed in Heck, 512 U.S. at 481.
59. See Preiser, 411 U.S. at 494.
60. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 486.
61. See id. at 484-86.
62. See id. at 483 (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 305
(1986)).
63. Id. at 483 (quoting, respectively, Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S.
299, 305 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 257-58 (1978)).
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cause, unlike the related cause of action for false arrest or
imprisonment, it permits damages for confinement imposed pursu-
ant to legal process. "If there is a false arrest claim, damages for
that claim cover the time of detention up until issuance of process
or arraignment, but not more." W. Keeton, D. Dobbs, R. Keeton,
& D. Owen, Prosser and Keeton on Law of Torts 888 (5th ed. 1984).
But a successful malicious prosecution plaintiff may recover, in ad-
dition to general damages, "compensation for any arrest or impris-
onment, including damages for discomfort or injury to his health, or
loss of time and deprivation of the society." Id. at 887-888 (foot-
notes omitted). See also Roberts v. Thomas, 135 Ky. 63, 121 S.W.
961 (1909).
One element that must be alleged and proved in a malicious
prosecution action is termination of the prior criminal proceeding in
favor of the accused. Prosser and Keeton, supra, at 874; Carpenter v.
Nutter, 127 Cal. 61, 59 P. 301 (1899). This requirement "avoids par-
allel litigation over the issues of probable cause and guilt.., and it
precludes the possibility of claimant [sic] succeeding in the tort ac-
tion after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecu-
tion, in contravention of a strong judicial policy against the creation
of two conflicting resolutions arising out of the same or identical
transaction." 8 S. Speiser, C. Krause, & A. Grans, American Law of
Torts § 28:5, p. 24 (1991).... We think the hoary principle that civil
tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity
of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages ac-
tions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness
of his conviction or confinement, just as it has always applied to
actions for malicious prosecution. 64
The italicized sentence appears to be a startling new holding that
§ 1983 plaintiffs must allege and prove the elements of the common
law action most closely analogous to the § 1983 action. 65 While the
Court has long looked to common law for guidance on the elements of
§ 1983 claims, it has done so only where the element is suggested by
the statute itself or where the issue must be resolved for the statute to
function. 66 The Heck Court states the "closest common law analog"
requirement without acknowledging that it is new or arguing for it in
any fashion.67 There is no argument made that the elements require-
ment meets either of the Court's standards of being indispensable or
so well-established that Congress must have intended that it apply.
64. Id. at 484-86 (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
65. I say "appears" because the Court does not explicitly state that the elements analysis is
a universal requirement for all § 1983 actions, but neither does it justify it as a special require-
ment in the Heck context. It is simply stated as a natural consequence of § 1983's status as a
"species of tort law." That reasoning applies to all § 1983 cases, not only a subset of prisoner
cases challenging the legality of convictions.
66. See Whitman, supra note 26, at 17.
67. See supra text accompanying note 54.
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It is important, in analyzing Heck, to separate the result in the
case from its analysis. The result may be correct: there may be strong
arguments against allowing state prisoners to sue for damages over
the legality of their convictions before they have exhausted other rem-
edies. However, the analysis used in Heck has the potential to create
significant new complications in § 1983 litigation and impose substan-
tial new obstacles on § 1983 plaintiffs. Thus, the Court's reasoning in
Heck merits close examination.
Perhaps, however, there is not great cause for concern. I may be
overreading Heck. Although Heck is written as if there is a universal
requirement in § 1983 cases that the plaintiff plead and prove the ele-
ments of the most closely analogous common law action, it may not be
applied outside the context of claims challenging criminal convictions,
where § 1983 damages litigation may be perceived as highly disrup-
tive. The Supreme Court itself has not indicated that it will insist on
compliance with Heck's elements analysis in all § 1983 cases. The
Court has decided several § 1983 cases since Heck and it has not men-
tioned the elements analysis again.68 This should not be surprising:
doctrinal consistency is not a hallmark of Supreme Court decision-
making. In the § 1983 area, for example, the Court has not even at-
tempted to explain its longstanding use of seemingly inconsistent
methodologies. 69 Perhaps Heck's elements analysis will languish si-
lently until a member of the Court, such as Heck's author Justice
Scalia, decides to use it to dispose of another troublesome § 1983 case.
b. Heck in the Lower Courts: No Elements Analysis
There is also no evidence that the lower courts are requiring all
§ 1983 plaintiffs to plead and prove the elements of an analogous com-
mon law cause of action. In fact, the lower courts have largely ignored
Heck's common law elements analysis. The lower courts have em-
braced Heck as an instrument for disposing of the large number of
§ 1983 cases that arise in the context out of which Heck itself arose-
damages actions that challenge some aspect of the legality of impris-
68. See Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct. 2440 (1995); Rosen-
berger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995). Indeed, in a § 1983
case extending Heck to claims seeking damages for the unconstitutional deprivation of good-
time credits in prison disciplinary hearings, the Court did not mention Heck's elements analysis,
perhaps because the elements analysis would not have supported the extension. See Edwards v.
Balisok, No. 95-1352 1997 WL 255341 (U.S. May 19, 1997).
69. See Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4.
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onment of the plaintiff.70 Heck is, in a sense, the new Parratt v. Tay-
lor7' in that it provides an easy way to resolve numerous § 1983 claims
against plaintiffs. That it does so in cases involving prisoners is a bo-
nus.72 While the lower courts have expansively applied Heck within
the prisoner litigation context, they have not applied Heck to other
sorts of claims, such as claims involving defamation or wrongful
discharge.73
There has been one major extension of Heck beyond challenges
to convictions.74 In addition to damages actions challenging convic-
tions, lower courts have applied Heck to bar damages actions directed
at unconstitutional procedures in prison disciplinary hearings 75 and
70. See, e.g., Fondren v. Klickitat County, 905 P.2d 928 (Wash. App. 1985). Interestingly,
the Fondren court presented the issue as resolving the relationship between the habeas statute
and § 1983 and did not refer to Heck as requiring § 1983 plaintiffs to plead and prove the ele-
ments of a common law cause of action. Id. at 933. Heck has also been applied to Bivens actions
brought by federal prisoners. See Williams v. Hill, 74 F.3d 1339, 1340 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Since
Bivens actions are a relatively recent creation of the federal courts, there is no authority for
imposing the elements of analogous common law actions on Bivens plaintiffs.
71. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
72. Congress has also recently tightened up on prison conditions litigation in the Prison
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-134, Title VIII, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat.
1321) 165. The Act, among its many provisions, addresses two important issues in prison condi-
tions litigation. First, it tightens up the standards for granting injunctive relief and release orders
in response to prison conditions. See id. at 168-70 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626). Second, it
requires all prisoners bringing § 1983 suits over prison conditions to exhaust available adminis-
trative remedies before filing suit in federal court. See id. at 180 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 1997e).
73. See Freeland v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., Civ. A. No. 9-2559, 1995 WL 129200 (E.D. Pa.
March 24, 1995) (citing Heck for § 1983's "no exhaustion" rule; Heck's elements analysis is not
mentioned in the § 1983 wrongful discharge type claim even though there is also a pendent state
wrongful discharge claim); Archleta v. Skolnick, No. C 95-1722S1, 1995 WL 552136 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 13, 1995) (district court applies Heck to claim challenging parole hearing but does not
mention Heck or common law elements when resolving defamation-type § 1983 claim).
74. In addition to the extension of Heck discussed in text, there is also one unpublished
decision applying Heck to bar a § 1983 action for compensatory, declaratory, and injunctive re-
lief in the context of civil confinement under a state sexual predator statute. See Young v.
Dreiblatt, No. 94-35808, 1996 WL 528375, at *1 (9th Cir. Sept. 13, 1996). The court held that,
under Heck, the action would not lie unless the plaintiff could show that his "civil confinement
had been invalidated." Id. There is no discussion in the brief memorandum opinion of the basis
for extending Heck beyond the context of damages actions implicating the legality of convictions
and there is no suggestion that the common law action challenging civil confinement has a
"favorable termination" requirement.
75. See Miller v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 75 F.3d 330 (7th Cir. 1996) (Posner, C.J.);
Best v. Kelly, 39 F.3d 328, 330 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Two courts of appeals have ruled that Heck does
not apply to damages actions based on due process challenges to disciplinary proceedings for
two reasons. See Armento-Bey v. Harper, 68 F.3d 215, 216 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam); Gotcher
v. Wood, 66 F.3d 1097, 1099 (9th Cir. 1995), petition for cert. filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3605 (U.S. Feb.
26, 1996) (No. 95-1385). First, because the Supreme Court in Heck explicitly stated, at least
where only the procedures in the hearing are challenged, that it does not, and second, because
success in the damages action would not necessarily reverse the substantive outcome since a new
hearing with proper procedures could conceiveably be held and reach the same result. See Ar-
mento-Bey, 68 F.3d at 216; Gotcher, 66 F.3d at 1099. In other words, the award of damages for
unconstitutional procedures would not obligate the state to release the prisoner. No case sup-
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parole hearings.76 This extension of Heck has been made in the face
of Supreme Court precedent directly to the contrary,77 but inspired by
dicta in Heck itself.78 These decisions require that the result of a disci-
ports or questions the applicability of Heck with a discussion of a common law analogy to the
§ 1983 claim involved. Chief Judge Posner distinguished Miller from these cases on the ground
that Miller was challenging the substance of the decision against him, not the procedures used to
arrive at it. See Miller, 75 F.3d at 331. While this distinction is consistent with dicta in Heck, it is
inconsistent with the holding of Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). See infra note 77.
76. See Schafer v. Moore, 46 F.3d 43, 45 (8th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
77. The Supreme Court specifically approved damages actions (and declaratory judgments)
challenging procedures in prison disciplinary hearings in Wolff, 418 U.S. 554-55. In Heck, the
Court stated that Wolff allows "'damages for the deprivation of civil rights"' but not "damages
for the deprivation of good-time credits." Heck, 512 U.S. at 482 (quoting Wolff, 418 U.S. at 553).
This distinction, as Judge Easterbrook recognized in an opinion holding that Heck bars a dam-
ages action even if all that is being challenged are the procedures used to deprive the prisoner of
good-time credits, makes no sense because it would allow damages to be awarded only for pro-
cedural errors not affecting the outcome of the hearing. See Evans v. McBride, 94 F.3d 1062,
1063 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 991 (1997). Judge Easterbrook finds it odd to award
any damages, even nominal damages, in such a case. See id. But that is exactly the kind of case
in which nominal damages are appropriate, to recognize procedural due process errors where
the outcome of a properly conducted hearing would have been the same. See Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1978). Thus, to make sense of Wolff, courts should allow damages (and
declaratory judgments) for unconstitutional deprivations of good-time credits and observe
Wolffs limitation of Preiser's restriction to injunctions actually restoring the credits. With all
due respect to Justice Scalia's and Judge Easterbrook's views to the contrary, an honest reading
of Wolff compels the conclusion that the only remedy that was foreclosed under Preiser and
Wolff was an order restoring the good-time credits. All other remedies, including damages for
their deprivation, were approved by the Court in Wolff. Here is the relevant language from
Wolff
[T]he complaint also sought damages; and Preiser expressly contemplated that claims
properly brought under § 1983 could go forward while actual restoration of good-time
credits is sought in state proceedings. Respondent's damages claim was therefore prop-
erly before the District Court and required determination of the validity of the proce-
dures employed for imposing sanctions, including loss of good time, for flagrant or
serious misconduct. Such a declaratory judgment as a predicate to a damages award
would not be barred by Preiser; and because under that case only an injunction restoring
good time improperly taken is foreclosed, neither would it preclude a litigant with stand-
ing from obtaining by way of ancillary relief an otherwise proper injunction enjoining
the prospective enforcement of invalid prison regulations. We therefore conclude that
it was proper for the Court of Appeals and the District Court to determine the validity
of the procedures for revoking good-time credits and to fashion appropriate remedies
for any constitutional violations ascertained, short of ordering the actual restoration of
good time already canceled.
Wolff, 418 U.S. at 554-55 (emphasis added) (citation and footnote omitted). Heck's dicta barring
damages for the deprivation of good-time credits is contrary to Wolff s explicit holding and the
product of a wish that § 1983 prisoner litigation would just go away.
78. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 482-83. Heck's statement, see supra note 77, that Wolff did not
recognize damages based on the actual loss of good-time credits is dicta because Heck itself did
not involve a challenge to a prison disciplinary hearing but rather was a challenge to a convic-
tion. That Wolff allowed damages based on unconstitutional deprivation of good-time credits,
see supra note 77, did not foreclose a rule that disallowed damages based on an unconstitutional
conviction. Under Heck, the question should be whether common law required a person seeking
damages based on deprivation of good-time credits to first have those credits restored in some
other proceeding. The Supreme Court itself has recently approved this extension of Heck in a
decision issued as this Article went to press. See Edwards v. Balisok, No. 95-1352 1997 WL
255341, (U.S. May 19, 1997).
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plinary or parole hearing be reversed in favor of the prisoner before
the prisoner may seek damages for constitutional violations in the pa-
role or disciplinary process. This goes beyond the holding in Heck
since damages based on an unlawful parole or disciplinary hearing do
not implicate the legality of a conviction and do not necessarily impli-
cate the legality of continued confinement. Parole and some discipli-
nary hearings, when the loss of good-time credits is involved, do
implicate the legality of continued confinement of the prisoner. The
courts that have applied Heck to all damages claims challenging pa-
role and disciplinary hearings have ignored Heck's basis in the ele-
ments of the malicious prosecution tort, from which the favorable
termination requirement is derived. Instead, they have applied Heck
as if it were an extension of the Preiser v. Rodriguez ban on § 1983
injunctive claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement to
damages claims challenging the fact or duration of confinement.
79
Without the elements analysis, there is no basis for applying Heck in
this context.80 This line of cases is contrary to Supreme Court prece-
dent8' and may violate the Supreme Court's general rule against re-
quiring § 1983 plaintiffs to exhaust their administrative remedies.
82
79. The best example of this is Miller v. Indiana Dep't of Corrections, 75 F.3d 330 (7th Cir.
1996). In Miller, Chief Judge Posner reasoned that Heck applies to damages actions attacking
disciplinary proceedings as follows:
The reasoning of Heck v. Humphrey is that a prisoner should not be able to use a suit
for damages to get around the procedures that have been established for challenging
the lawfulness of continued confinement. It is irrelevant whether the challenged con-
finement is pursuant to a judgment imposing a sentence or an administrative refusal to
shorten the sentence by awarding good-time credits.
Id. at 331. This reads more like an extension of Preiser than an application of Heck's common
law elements analysis. In Chief Judge Posner's analysis, the genesis of the Heck rule, in the
elements of the malicious prosecution action, is apparently irrelevant.
80. I am uncertain whether malicious prosecution would be the closest common law anal-
ogy to a damages claim over an unconstitutionally held disciplinary or parole hearing. In an-
other context, the Supreme Court has held that prison disciplinary hearings are not analogous to
judicial hearings. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 206 (1985) (holding that prison guards
hearing disciplinary cases are not entitled to absolute judicial immunity from damages in § 1983
cases).
81. The statement in text is no longer true since, as this Article went to press, the Supreme
Court held, in Edwards v. Balisok, No. 95-1352 1997 WL 255341 (U.S. May 19, 1997), that Heck
bars damages claims for due process violations resulting in the deprivation of prisoners' good-
time credits unless the good-time credits have been restored either within the state system or on
habeas corpus review. See id. The Court repeated its misstatement that Wolf v. McDonnell did
not allow § 1983 damages claims based on unconstitutional deprivations of good-time credits
(see supra note 77) and stated that Heck bars due process damages claims whenever they "neces-
sarily imply the invalidity of the deprivation of... good-time credits." Edwards at WL 255341.
The Edwards Court did not mention Heck's elements analysis and it apparently viewed the issue
of Heck's applicability to prison disciplinary hearings as settled by Heck's dictum to that effect.
82. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982). In Edwards, the Supreme
Court explicitly disapproved of some lower courts' practice of staying § 1983 cases while prison-
ers sought restoration of good-time credits. The Court stated that this violates Patsy, and the
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In one situation, Heck has been applied in favor of plaintiffs seek-
ing damages for unconstitutional confinement. Because Heck holds
that a § 1983 damages claim in situations analogous to malicious pros-
ecution does not accrue until the plaintiff's conviction has been
voided, courts have held that the statute of limitations does not begin
running until the conviction was voided even if the wrongful conduct
occured earlier.83 Thus, if the plaintiff's damages claim is based, for
example, on a police officer's suppression of exculpatory evidence, the
cause of action accrues on the date that the plaintiff prevailed in chal-
lenging the conviction and not on the date that the police officer
should have turned over the exculpatory evidence. Heck's rule thus
applied has saved several § 1983 claims from the statute of limitations
defense.8"
Although Heck's effect on the timing accrual of claims challeng-
ing conduct leading to convictions has been widely employed in favor
of § 1983 plaintiffs, as is often the case in § 1983 jurisprudence, courts
have struggled to keep Heck's positive effect for plaintiffs as narrow as
possible. For example, a district court has held that a § 1983 plaintiff
who was arrested but never convicted is not entitled to Heck's delay in
the accrual of causes of action arising out of the prosecution. 85 The
court held that Heck's rationale applies only to § 1983 damages claims
that challenge the legality of convictions or sentences, and not to ac-
tions by state criminal defendants where there has been no conviction.
The court did not discuss whether the common law allows a state
criminal defendant who had not yet been convicted to bring a mali-
cious prosecution damages claim while the prosecution is still pend-
ing.86 The court did not refer to Heck's common law elements
analysis. The court acknowledged that this puts the state defendant in
an awkward position since he may have to sue while state proceedings
proper practice is to dismiss the § 1983 claim as not cognizable absent restoration of the good-
time credits in some other forum. 1997 WL 255341.
83. See, e.g., Black v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 72, 75 (2d Cir. 1996) ("Under the principle an-
nounced in Heck, Black's cause of action for denial of due process in the disciplinary proceed-
ings did not accrue until he succeeded in having the disciplinary ruling reversed by the state
court in 1991. Black's original complaint, filed in 1993, was therefore not time-barred."); Smith v.
Holtz, 87 F.3d 108 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 611 (1996).
84. See also Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1996) (Federal Tort
Claims Act ("FFCA") claim challenging arrest did not accrue until acquittal).
85. See Tribblet v. Sanchez, No. 95-C6816, 1996 WL 364750, at *1-3 (N.D. Ill. June 27,
1996).
86. Prosser and Keeton on Torts indicates that the common law action for malicious prose-
cution does not lie while criminal charges are still pending and that acquittal meets the favorable
termination requirement. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 15, at 874-75. Thus, if the Tribblet
court had looked to the common law, it should have held that Heck's effect on the accrual of the
§ 1983 damages claim applies to acquitted defendants.
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are pending, before he knows whether he will be convicted.87
Morevoer, if the defendant is convicted, Heck may require that the
claim be dismissed.88 It is also likely that a federal court would stay a
damages claim challenging the legality of a state prosecution while
that prosecution was still pending, thus transforming the filing of the
federal suit into a "hurry up and wait" exercise. The court did allow
for the possibility that under these odd circumstances equitable tolling
of the statute of limitations might excuse the delay, but because the
plaintiff in the particular case did not argue equitable tolling, the court
did not apply it.89
Further, the courts have been strict regarding which claims are
entitled to Heck's later accrual effect. For Heck to delay the accrual
of the cause of action to the date that the conviction is voided, it is
necessary that the § 1983 claim be one that challenges the legality of
the conviction. Otherwise Heck does not apply and the cause of ac-
tion accrues earlier. For example, a claim challenging a warrantless
arrest for lack of probable cause does not necessarily implicate the
legality of a subsequent conviction. Thus, the § 1983 claim might ac-
crue on the date of the arrest, not on some date in the future when a
state court voids the conviction. 90
Courts anxious to apply Heck to bar § 1983 claims also appear
willing to ignore procedural defaults when committed by the state as
§ 1983 defendant but not by the state prisoner turned § 1983 plaintiff.
For example, even though the defendants did not make the argument,
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that Heck barred a
damages claim over the procedures used in a prison disciplinary hear-
ing.91 The court noted that it had previously held that Heck was not
jurisdictional,92 but nonetheless held that the fact that the defendants
87. See Tribblet, 1996 WL 364750, at *3.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See Brooks v. City of Winston-Salem, 85 F.3d 178, 182-83 (4th Cir. 1996). In Brooks,
the court held that a claim challenging a warrantless arrest accrues on the date of the arrest while
a claim challenging an arrest pursuant to a warrant that later turned out not to be supported by
probable cause accrues on the date that the state proceedings terminate in favor of the accused.
See id. However, equitable tolling might be available to delay the running of the statute of
limitations in cases where the § 1983 plaintiff was incarcerated while claims were lost due to the
running of the statute of limitations. See Tribblet, 1996 WL 364750, at *3 (plaintiff did not estab-
lish elements of equitable tolling); Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 96 F.3d 1246, 1248-50 (9th
Cir. 1996) (Mexican national who was kidnapped by federal agencts, tried and acquitted of drug
charges in the United States, was entitled to equitable tolling on FTCA claims to which Heck's
delay of the date of accrual did not apply).
91. See Dixon v. Chrans, 101 F.3d 1228, 1230 (7th Cir. 1996).
92. Subject matter jurisdiction can be raised at any time and even by the court sua sponte.
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had not raised Heck in the district court did not preclude them from
raising it for the first time in the court of appeals because "Heck grows
out of well-established law ... we decline to close our eyes to real-
ity."' 93 One would think that the fact that Heck's principles are well-
established would argue against allowing a party to raise if for the first
time on appeal since novelty might be an excuse for not raising it at
trial. Imagine if a criminal defendant or prisoner had failed to raise an
element of "well-established" law; would the court of appeals refuse
to blind itself to the reality that the defendant had been improperly
convicted, or would it apply familiar rules of procedural default and
deny the criminal defendant's claim?
It would be extremely onerous and a clear break from well-estab-
lished patterns to require every plaintiff in every § 1983 case to iden-
tify the closest common law analog and superimpose its elements on
those already required by the Constitution and statute. It may, how-
ever, be unrealistic to expect hundreds of lower court judges to radi-
cally alter their practices in § 1983 cases unless the Supreme Court
repeats its Heck elements analysis in a series of cases. So perhaps
Heck will not bring a significant change in § 1983 litigation, except in
the context of prisoners challenging decisions that affect the length of
their confinement. In fact, in the lower courts, post-Heck decisions
look very similar, in form, to pre-Heck decisions in that they do not
employ Heck's elements analysis.94
c. Heck's Outcome: Toward a More Statutory Focus
It is unclear to me whether a criminal defendant should be able to
pursue damages based on the unconstitutionality of his charge or con-
viction before he has been released on acquittal, appeal, habeas
corpus, or in some other proceeding. The one clear exception that
should be made from Heck's rule is that a convict who cannot seek
habeas corpus should be allowed to bring a damages action challeng-
ing his conviction. This would include prisoners who have been re-
leased because of the expiration of their sentences and convicts whose
punishment did not include imprisonment. 95
93. Dixon, 101 F.3d at 1231.
94. Compare cases cited in supra notes 70-94 with cases cited in Heck v. Humphrey, 997
F.2d 355 (7th Cir. 1993), affd, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
95. Habeas relief may not be available in such circumstances because habeas relief is avail-
able only to someone in custody. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1994); Harts v. Indiana, 732 F.2d 95 (7th
Cir. 1984) (suspension of driver's license is not sufficient restriction on liberty to amount to
"custody" for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 2254).
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For prisoners with very short sentences, or convicts who are fined
or receive some other noncustodial punishment, the habeas remedy
may not be available and they ought to be allowed to raise their con-
stitutional challenges to their convictions in a damages action. In such
cases, the § 1983 claim may be the only realistic avenue of relief.96
The Preiser rule would have to be expanded if it were to bar dam-
ages actions challenging the legality of convictions. The language of
§ 1983 grants the damages action in all these cases. However, the lan-
guage of the statute also creates the equity action for release from
prison that was rejected in Preiser. The narrow exception recognized
in Preiser was based completely on the fact that a plaintiff seeking
release from prison in a § 1983 case is, in essence, engaged in avoid-
ance of the habeas statute's more restrictive procedural requirements,
namely exhaustion of state remedies. Preiser does not apply directly
to Heck's damages action since Heck did not seek release from prison.
Despite the fact that Preiser did not apply directly to damages
actions, there was precedent for the Court's outcome, if not for its
reasoning. The Court might have relied upon the interaction between
the two statutes rather than on the new common law elements rule.
The Heck Court's reasoning, that once a claim for damages based on
an unconstitutional conviction was upheld the state would feel obli-
gated to release the prisoner, could have been employed in a more
direct manner in an analysis of the interaction between the two stat-
utes involved.97 Rather than rely on the common law, the Court
might have confronted directly the relationship between § 1983 and
the habeas statute. It might have concluded that damages for an un-
constitutional conviction, before exhaustion, would undercut the ex-
haustion requirement of the habeas statute and therefore should not
be allowed.
Preiser is not the only precedent for a more statutory-focused ap-
proach. The Court has held, in another context, that a federal statute
addressing one small area of potential constitutional tort violations
96. Even if habeas relief is not available, defendants are able to appeal their convictions.
Some people might not have the resources to appeal a small fine, and a short sentence might
expire before completion of an appeal. For these people, Heck would effectively bar the § 1983
damages action. In Heck, the Court did allow for the possibility that a pardon would be suffi-
cient to satisfy the invalidation requirement. Thus, a person whose sentence involved only a
modest fine might find it uneconomical to achieve "invalidation" so that a § 1983 damages action
might be pursued. However, it may be extremely difficult and expensive to seek a pardon in
some states, and it might take much longer than an appeal or habeas.
97. In fact, unless a lack of identity of the issues or parties precluded it, the judgment in the




displaces the § 1983 action for cases that fall within the purview of the
narrower statute.98 The Court relied on the fact that the procedures
for bringing an action under the narrower statute, which was aimed
primarily at government conduct, were more complicated than those
for a simple § 1983 claim and that all litigants would, if allowed, avoid
the more onerous procedures by litigating under § 1983.99 If a nar-
rower statute can completely displace the § 1983 claim, the Court
might have held that the habeas statute partially displaces the § 1983
damages action, perhaps until the habeas remedy is exhausted.
Since damages cannot be awarded on habeas, the habeas action
for release from confinement should not completely displace the
§ 1983 damages action. The fact that the only remedy under the
habeas statute is release from confinement should not, however, pre-
clude that statute from affecting the availability or timing of the
§ 1983 damages action. In fact, while the interaction between the two
statutes is described above as an exhaustion regime, that is somewhat
misleading because when a conviction is upheld by the state court and
on federal habeas review, a damages remedy under § 1983 might be
foreclosed by preclusion rules. It is well-established that preclusion
rules bar relitigation in § 1983 actions of issues litigated in a state
criminal proceeding.1°° Thus, if the § 1983 plaintiff did not prevail in
his state court or federal habeas challenges to his conviction, a subse-
quent damages action might not be available, not because he could
not allege an element of a malicious prosecution action, but rather
because his claims were barred by issue preclusion. In effect this
would be the same as Heck: the § 1983 plaintiff challenging the legal-
ity of a conviction would be required to prevail in some other forum
before the § 1983 damages remedy would be available. Therefore, I
hesitate to characterize this reasoning as an exhaustion requirement
because, while exhaustion is required, a state prisoner would also be
required to prevail on habeas or some other post-conviction challenge
before the § 1983 remedy would be available.' 0 Exhaustion alone
98. See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1009-13 (1984) (holding that the Education for the
Handicapped Act provides the exclusive remedy for public school discrimination in education
against handicapped children and thus preempts the § 1983 action in such cases). But see Trigg v.
Fort Wayne Community Schs., 766 F.2d 299, 302 (7th Cir. 1985) (Title VII and § 1983 both
provide remedies for discrimination in government employment).
99. See id.
100. See Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1980).
101. The court of appeals in Heck recognized this. It affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Heck's damages action on the ground that an action challenging the legality of a conviction, even
when the remedy sought is damages, is in reality a habeas corpus action and therefore state
remedies must be exhausted. See Heck v. Humphrey, 997 F.2d 355, 357 (7th Cir. 1993), affd, 512
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would not be sufficient for a § 1983 damages action, but it is sufficient
to preserve the availability of the habeas action.
102
The reasoning above concerning the relationship between the
habeas corpus remedy and § 1983 is similar to the Court's treatment
of the Tax Anti-Injunction Act.103 That statute bars federal court in-
junctions against state taxes unless there is no plain, speedy, and effi-
cient state remedy. 1°4 Despite the fact that Congress prohibited only
injunctive relief, the Court has also barred declaratory and damages
relief against state tax collection.' 0 5 The Court held that Congress'
specification that injunctions should not be issued did not preclude the
Court from relying on principles of comity-federal-state relations-
to deny other forms of relief. Rather than treat the tax statute as pre-
empting judicial abstention based on similar concerns, the Court
treated that statute much like common law precedent by using it as an
example of the importance of the principle that the Court might ad-
vance in contexts not strictly covered by it.
The Court could treat the relationship between the habeas statute
and § 1983 similarly even if it does not believe that the habeas statute
itself actually precludes a damages action challenging the constitution-
ality of a conviction. The Court's reasoning in the tax context applies
easily to Heck:
Petitioners will not recover damages under § 1983 unless a dis-
trict court first determines that respondents' administration of the
County tax system violated petitioners' constitutional rights. In ef-
fect, the district court must first enter a declaratory judgment like
that barred in [Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319
U.S. 293 (1943)]. We are convinced that such a determination would
U.S. 477 (1994). The Seventh Circuit clearly believed that if Heck did not prevail either at the
state level or on habeas, his damages action would necessarily fail due to preclusion: "Indeed, if
his conviction were proper, this suit would in all likelihood be barred by res judicata." Id.
102. On habeas, petitioners are required to raise all their challenges to their convictions in
state court, and an exception to preclusion rules is made to allow them to raise the same issues in
federal court on habeas review. An issue not raised in state court may not serve as the basis for
a habeas petition-it is considered waived or forfeited. If Heck had been decided under the
reasoning discussed here, rather than under the elements analysis actually used, the Court pre-
sumably would have required that § 1983 damages plaintiffs raise all their issues on appeal or in
habeas and that any issue not so raised would be waived. This would leave no way around
preclusion.
103. This argument, relying upon Fair Assessment in Real Estate Ass'n v. McNary, 454 U.S.
100 (1981), was made by Respondents in their brief in Heck v. Humphrey. See Brief for Respon-
dents at 11, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) (No. 93-6188) (discussing the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
104. For a discussion of this provision, see Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 450 U.S. 503
(1981).
105. See McNary, 454 U.S. at 113-15 (damages relief); Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v.
Huffman, 319 U.S. 293, 300 (1943) (declaratory relief).
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be fully as intrusive as the equitable actions that are barred by prin-
ciples of comity. Moreover, the intrusiveness of such § 1983 actions
would be exacerbated by the nonexhaustion doctrine of Monroe v.
Pape, supra. Taxpayers such as petitioners would be able to invoke
federal judgments without first permitting the State to rectify any
alleged impropriety. 1°6
Similarly, damages based on the unconstitutionality of a convic-
tion would be based on a finding that the conviction is unconstitu-
tional and would, almost of its own force, necessitate the prisoner's
release. Further, § 1983's no exhaustion rule would allow federal liti-
gation before the prisoner pursued state post-conviction remedies. 107
Thus, the Court could have reached the same result in Heck by
concentrating on the interaction between § 1983 and the habeas
corpus statute and without creating this new and potentially massive
influx of common law doctrines into § 1983 litigation. The virtue in
this would be that the focus would remain on the statutes and their
policies, which is preferable to the dubious, unprecedented, and po-
tentially disastrous (for § 1983 plaintiffs) incorporation of common
law elements in Heck. I can only speculate about the reasons that the
Court chose the tack it did. The elements analysis was not mentioned
in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's opinion or in any of
the briefs on the merits in Heck. 08 Its first mention appears to have
been at oral argument before the Court. Asked whether Heck should
be required, since § 1983 is like a tort cause of action, to make out the
favorable termination element of a malicious prosecution tort claim,
Heck's attorney responded: "that argument has not been suggested at
any point during the course of this litigation.' 1 9 Perhaps Justice
106. McNary, 454 U.S. at 113-14.
107. The Court would need to create an exception to the rule that exhaustion of remedies is
not required in § 1983 cases, since prisoners would be forced to exhaust their post-conviction
remedies before seeking damages for unconstitutional convictions. The Court has already done
so in Preiser, and, in effect, in Heck, by holding that the § 1983 damages remedy is not available
unless the plaintiff prevailed in some other forum on a claim for release from confinement.
108. See Heck, 997 F.2d 355; Brief for Respondent, supra note 103. The Brief, id. at i, stated
the questions presented as follows:
1. Whether a state prisoner attacking the legality of his conviction may circumvent the
exhaustion requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) by filing an action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and confining his prayer for relief to a declaratory judgment and money
damages.
2. Whether a state prisoner's action attacking the legality of his conviction that includes
unexhausted claims should be dismissed without prejudice, rather than stayed, pending
exhaustion of state remedies.
109. 1994 WL 665259, at *8 (Transcript of Oral Argument in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S.
477 (1994). Query whether the Court should have affirmed based on an argument never raised
by the Respondent. Cf Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807,809, 812 (1994) (plaintiff may have had
a Fourth Amendment claim but he could not prevail on that basis since he made no argument
based on the Fourth Amendment).
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Scalia's general preference for common law explains why he chose to
ground his opinion on the applicability of common law elements to
§ 1983 claims. The other members of the majority may not have con-
sidered the potential ramifications of this new rule or realized that
requiring the elements of the closest common law action was a signifi-
cant new requirement for § 1983 litigation. Perhaps because reason-
ing directly under the two statutes would appear to be judicial
tinkering with congressional mandates, the majority preferred the ap-
pearance of objectivity and basis in precedent that the common law
approach provided. However, the common law actually provides only
a veneer of objectivity together with a host of new difficulties as dis-
cussed below. Whatever the reasons, the Court's rule in Heck created
an unnecessary and significant injection of common law concepts into
§ 1983 litigation. Only time will tell if it sticks and, if so, what effect it
will have.
d. Heck's Common Law Elements Analysis as Inconsistent with
Basic Section 1983 Principles
Although the rule of Heck, that a prisoner may not seek damages
based upon the unconstitutionality of his or her convictions unless the
conviction has somehow been declared invalid, may be sound, the
analysis in Heck is inconsistent with prior law in several ways and
troubling as a normative matter. The first break with past doctrine is
the broad requirement of common law elements for the § 1983 action.
The Court previously stated that there are "two essential elements to
a § 1983 action": 1) action under color of law and 2) a violation of a
constitutional right.110 This statement was somewhat inaccurate even
when it was made because there were always additional elements as
well, including the requirement that the defendant be a person; that
the violation be caused by the defendant; and for the award of more
than nominal damages, that the plaintiff suffer injury of the sort com-
pensable under common law principles. However, none of these ele-
ments goes to the nature and content of a cognizable claim or imposes
significant additional requirements for § 1983 actions in the same way
that the common law elements required under Heck does."'
In fact, Justice Scalia's opinion is quite extreme on the relation-
ship between § 1983 and analogous common law. Basically, he stated
110. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474
U.S. 327 (1986).
111. Justice Souter discussed this in his Heck dissent, 512 U.S. at 491-96.
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that claims not allowed under the common law should not be allowed
under § 1983. Justice Souter, in dissent, argued that the majority's
statement of the "favorable termination" element is actually inconsis-
tent with the common law because under the common law a malicious
prosecution case could not be maintained once a conviction had oc-
curred. 112 Under the common law, the fact of conviction proved that
there had been probable cause for the prosecution. 1 3 Justice Scalia
disputed Justice Souter's claim that there is an absolute rule against a
malicious prosecution action after a conviction, but he also stated that
if there were such a rule it "would, if anything, strengthen our belief
that § 1983, which borrowed general tort principles, was not meant to
permit such collateral attack."1 4 This reveals the power of the new
requirement that § 1983 plaintiffs prove the elements of the most
analogous common law action: If they cannot do so, they have no
§ 1983 claim.
Suppose the majority agreed with Justice Souter that, once a con-
viction had occurred, the common law cause of action for malicious
prosecution was forever barred, even if subsequently the conviction
was held invalid. Suppose also that Heck convinced a court that,
under the circumstances, it was unconstitutional for the officials in-
volved to prosecute him. He would have proven action under color of
law that deprived him of a constitutional right. Yet under the major-
ity's analysis he would have no § 1983 claim because under the com-
mon law the most analogous common law tort action was not
available. The Court's assumption that Congress intended for § 1983
remedies to be unavailable whenever no common law remedy exists
seems to be exactly the opposite of the more sensible notion that the
absence of suitable remedies was part of the motivation for Congress'
providing the § 1983 action. This result turns the relationship of
§ 1983 and state law on its head, since the most compelling situation in
which the § 1983 action should be available is where there is no other
remedy for unconstitutional conduct.
This illustrates the difficulty the Court has had in creating the
proper relationship between § 1983 and state tort law. In some cir-
cumstances, the existence of state remedies has been cited as a reason
against recognizing the § 1983 claim."15 For example, Justice Kennedy
112. See id. at 494.
113. Presumably, lack of probable cause should also be an element of the § 1983 claim since
it is apparently an element of a malicious prosecution action.
114. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 484-85 n.4.
115. Cf. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
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has argued that the existence of adequate state remedies should bar
civil rights claims beyond those contexts in which that is already the
case.116 The Court has often attempted to distinguish between legiti-
mate § 1983 claims and ordinary tort actions. Yet Heck takes the op-
posite view and holds that the absence of a tort claim counsels against
recognition of the § 1983 claim. In the vernacular, this is known as
having it both ways.
At bottom, Heck amounts to the rejection of the theoretical basis
of Monroe v. Pape's holding that the § 1983 action is available without
regard to state law. Monroe held that the § 1983 remedy is available
regardless of whether or not the state provided a remedy for the con-
duct involved, 1 7 and that even given a state remedy, the § 1983 plain-
tiff did not have to first seek a remedy under state law." 8 As Louise
Weinberg pointed out, the true innovation of Monroe was its recogni-
tion of the offensive damages remedy of the constitutional tort action
for constitutional violations.1 9
The competing vision of constitutional enforcement was
presented by Justice Frankfurter in his Monroe dissent.' 20 There, he
argued that constitutional rights should ordinarily not be used as a
sword to achieve a damages remedy but rather only as a shield against
official conduct. 12' Justice Frankfurter apparently thought that vic-
tims of official torts should sue under state common law and that the
Fourteenth Amendment would come into play if the state recognized
a defense based on their official status and duties. The Constitution
might be employed by plaintiffs as a reply to the defense. 122
This alternative is just what Heck requires as a matter of sub-
stance, although procedurally Heck twists things around somewhat.
Plaintiffs under Heck must establish the elements of the nearest state
common law analog. If they cannot, they lose their cases not because
116. See AIbright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 818-19 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
117. 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs.
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
118. See id. at 183.
119. See Weinberg, supra note 25.
120. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 202-59 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
121. See id. at 245.
122. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). This is the regime that the
federal government presented as the alternative to the Bivens action under which victims of
constitutional violations by federal officials sue for damages. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 390-92 (1971) (creating damages remedy
against federal officials whose conduct violates the Constitution). The Court created that cause
of action in the Bivens case in the face of the government's argument that victims should be
forced to sue under state law and that the Constitution would be relevant only as a reply to the
federal officials' defense based on their official status and duties. See id.
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there was no constitutional violation, but because they cannot make
out a state tort claim. Under Justice Frankfurter's alternative regime,
this would also be true because government official defendants in a
state tort action could defend based on either the plaintiff's failure to
make out the elements of the tort claim or their official status. If the
plaintiff does not successfully allege or prove the state tort aspects of
the claim, the constitutionality of the defendant's conduct would be
irrelevant and the court would not reach it. Establishing a constitu-
tional violation is necessary, under Frankfurter's view, to overcome
the defense based on official privilege. Under Heck, the same result
occurs: if the plaintiff cannot allege and prove the elements of the
analogous common law action, the constitutionality of the defendant's
conduct is never reached. Thus, in the course of deciding the narrow
issue in Heck, the Court has managed to reject, sub-silentio, the foun-
dations of thirty-five years of constitutional tort doctrine. 23 The inde-
pendence of the § 1983 remedy is gone.
Another inconsistency with prior law, which grows out of the
first, is that under Heck there may be situations in which statutory
state of mind requirements will be imposed on § 1983 actions despite
the Court's earlier rejection of such requirements. Before Heck, the
Court had firmly held that the only state of mind requirements in
§ 1983 cases arose from the underlying constitutional violations and
not from the statute itself.' 24 Once action under color of law and a
constitutional violation were established, § 1983 was, in essence, a
strict liability provision. State of mind requirements vary among tort
actions, and if courts require each § 1983 plaintiff to plead and prove
the elements of the most analogous tort, there will likely be many situ-
ations in which § 1983 plaintiffs will be required, as a matter of the
statute, to prove that the defendant acted with a state of mind differ-
123. I hesitate to argue that Heck overrules Monroe since the claim that Monroe is overruled
has been made before. Some wrongly believed that Parratt overruled Monroe because Parratt's
focus on the availability of state remedies is in tension with Monroe's holding that state remedies
are irrelevant to the availability of the § 1983 action. However, it should have been clear that
Parratt was about the constitutional claim of a violation of procedural due process, and not about
whether state remedies preempt the § 1983 action. Heck, on the other hand, is about whether
the § 1983 remedy is available and thus is a better candidate for overruling or at least seriously
undercutting Monroe.
124. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534-35. For example, equal protection violations require inten-
tional discrimination, see Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-45 (1976), and Eighth Amend-
ment violations require various states of mind depending on the context: Inadequate medical
care Eighth Amendment claims require deliberate indifference, see Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S.
97, 101-06 (1976), while excessive force claims require malicious intent to injure. See Whitley v.
Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 318-22 (1986). These state of mind requirements arise from the Constitu-
tion and not from § 1983.
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ent from that required to establish the underlying constitutional
violation.
A good example of a state of mind requirement that might be
imposed in a § 1983 action is the tort raised by Justice Souter in his
Heck dissent: abuse of process.125 According to Justice Souter's de-
scription of that tort, if a court holds that abuse of process is the most
closely analogous tort to a particular § 1983 claim, the plaintiff would
have to prove that the defendant acted in bad faith or with a wrongful
purpose in employing legal process. This would be in addition to any
state of mind requirement contained in the constitutional provision
under which the plaintiff was suing. For example, if the claim were
based upon the Fourth Amendment, the most common source of
claims challenging arrests, 126 the plaintiff might have to prove both the
unreasonableness of the arrest as a constitutional matter and the mal-
ice of the defendant as a statutory element.
3. Common Law and the Distinction between Torts and Section
1983 Actions
Despite my argument that Heck's analysis works an important
and significant change in the law, its rule that all § 1983 plaintiffs must
prove the elements of the most closely analogous § 1983 claim is not
completely without precedent, although it had appeared that the
Court rejected it in its earlier incarnation. Early in the post-Monroe
development of the § 1983 action courts sometimes asked whether a
particular tort, when committed by a local official, was a violation of
§ 1983. The question was asked in this way, at least in part, because of
the courts' impression of § 1983 as a tort-like remedy that would, of
necessity, share many features of common law tort actions.
Whirl v. Kern127 is an excellent example of a lower court case that
analyzes a § 1983 action largely in common law terms. That case was
an action for damages brought by an arrestee who had been held in
jail "awaiting trial" for nine months after all charges against him had
been dismissed. 128 The court found the common law background
125. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 494-95 (1994).
126. See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807 (1994).
127. 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968). Whirl is included in at least one major casebook on consti-
tutional torts, see CHARLES F. ABERNATHY, CIVIL Riorss AND CONSTITUTIONAL LITIGATION,
CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 1992), and is discussed in Sheldon H. Nahmod, Section 1983 and
the 'Background' of Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 14-16 (1975). Nahmod is critical of the Whirl
court's focus on state law for the elements of the § 1983 claim. See id. He calls the decision
"influential." Id. at 13.
128. See Whirl, 407 F.2d at 785.
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highly relevant to both the elements of the § 1983 claim (the elements
of false arrest and false imprisonment cases are discussed) and to the
scope of the good faith defense that might be available to such
torts.129 While the Whirl court did acknowledge that § 1983 plaintiffs
must establish that the Constitution was violated, the court's analysis
of the claim is drawn largely from the common law, as is the court's
analysis of whether the jailer's good faith should be a defense to the
false imprisonment. 30
This focus on common law elements in § 1983 cases was not
adopted by the Supreme Court before Heck. When cases raising simi-
lar concerns began making their way to the Supreme Court, the Court
addressed the issues in significantly different terms from the lower
courts that pushed the tort analogy as far as the court in Whirl. Per-
haps the Court recognized the inconsistency between the Whirl meth-
odology and Monroe v. Pape. The Supreme Court has focused much
more on the constitutional aspects of the cases to decide whether lia-
bility should exist. The Court did continue to look to tort concepts for
guidance on matters like causation and damages, but in deciding
whether conduct gave rise to a constitutional claim under § 1983, the
issue was whether the challenged conduct violated constitutional
norms, and not whether the elements of a common law tort were pres-
ent.' 3' In fact, the Court worked hard to distinguish tort law from
§ 1983 claims, and repeatedly attempted to create doctrines to ensure
that common law torts were not automatically redressible under
§ 1983 when committed by government officials. 32 The Court repeat-
edly stated that § 1983 was not a "font of tort law" and resisted the
argument that state tort law created interests that were protected
from government deprivation without due process. 33
An important case in which the Court resisted creating a § 1983
case out of every common law tort committed by a state official is
Paul v. Davis.13 In that case, the plaintiff had been placed by the
129. See id. at 790-91, 793-94.
130. See id. at 790-92, 793-96.
131. As discussed below, the Court has looked to common law for guidance in shaping the
contours of constitutional provisions. This is another significant point of influence of common
law on § 1983 actions, but it is, nonetheless, distinct from the Heck doctrine since it involves
defining constitutional rights, not specifying § 1983 elements when a constitutional violation is
present.
132. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977);
Paratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327
(1986). I wrote about the Court's attempts in Beermann, supra note 53.
133. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
134. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
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sheriff on a list of active shoplifters even though he had not been con-
victed of any offense.135 The plaintiff sued, claiming that doing this
without a hearing violated his due process rights. 136 The Court re-
jected the claim that defamation by a government official automati-
cally deprived the victim of liberty without due process. 137 The Court
held that a liberty interest would be violated only if the defamation
resulted in some restriction on the plaintiff, such as inability to find
employment or exclusion from places of business. 38 Again, the
Court's focus was not on common law elements but rather on the con-
stitutional aspects of the case; in this case, on defining the liberty in-
terests protected under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In fact, the Court viewed the question as whether there
was a constitutionally protected interest at stake, and decided there
was not, despite its conclusion that the interest in reputation was pro-
tected under state tort law. 139
The motivation behind the Court's rejection of the claim in Paul
is made crystal clear in its opinion. The Court did not want to create a
§ 1983 case out of every common law tort committed by a local gov-
ernment official. The Court stated that "Respondent's construction
would seem almost necessarily to result in every legally cognizable
injury which may have been inflicted by a state official acting under
'color of law' establishing a violation of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."1 40 The Court characterizes the plaintiff's claim as a "classical
claim for defamation actionable in the courts of every State.'' The
Court is seeking to separate tort and § 1983, not merge them. 42
The separation of tort concepts from constitutional tort issues
reached its high water mark in Parratt v. Taylor.43 In that case, a state
135. See id. at 696.
136. See id. at 696-97; id. at 720-21 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. See id. at 693.
138. See id. at 710-12.
139. See id. at 712 (plaintiffs "interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the
State may protect against injury by virtue of its tort law" but is "neither 'liberty' nor 'property'
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law"). Insofar as this amounts to a
holding that state tort law is not sufficient to create interests protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, I have argued that this conclusion is inconsistent with the basics of due process law.
See Beermann, supra note 53, at 328-29.
140. Paul, 424 U.S. at 699.
141. Id. at 697.
142. It would not be inconsistent with Paul to require that all § 1983 plaintiffs be able to
allege and prove the elements of a tort claim. Paul most clearly states that it would not be
sufficient to do so: it does not address whether it would be necessary. Nonetheless, my reading
of Paul and the cases that follow it is that alleging and proving the elements of a common law
action was neither necessary nor sufficient for a successful § 1983 claim.
143. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part by Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
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prisoner's mail order hobby kit was received by the prison but never
delivered to the prisoner who ordered it.1'" The prisoner sued, argu-
ing that he had been deprived of his property without due process
since no hearing had been held before his property was lost or sto-
len. 145 The Court in this case, as mentioned above, stated that there
were two essential elements to a § 1983 claim: action under color of
law and a constitutional violation. 1 The Court denied the claim on
the purely constitutional ground that under the circumstances it was
unrealistic to suppose that the state could have provided a pre-depri-
vation hearing and that the state's post-deprivation tort remedy pro-
vided all the process that was due.147 The Court did not explore the
elements of the common law torts that might have been committed.
The Court continued its effort to separate constitutional tort is-
sues from common law concepts by overruling Parratt v. Taylor's ap-
parent holding that negligent conduct could amount to a violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court ruled that negligent conduct
could not "deprive" a person of a protected interest within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment.' a The Court separated constitu-
tional concepts from their tort law counterparts, relying on the
language of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly its use of the
word "deprive", and its view that creating a Fourteenth Amendment
claim out of every negligent injury inflicted by an official would trivi-
alize the Amendment by reducing it to the level of a garden variety
common law tort claim rather than maintaining it as a higher level
constitutional doctrine. 149
I argued in an earlier article that the Court should constitutional-
ize state tort law to the limited extent that torts committed by govern-
ment officials violate the Constitution when compensation is not
available within the state system to the same extent that such compen-
sation is available if the tortfeasor were a private party.1 50 I argued
that the Court's effort in Paul to distinguish reputation from other
personal interests that are protected from deprivation without due
144. See id. at 530.
145. See id.
146. See id. at 535.
147. See id. at 543.
148. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
149. See id. at 331-33.
150. See Beermann, supra note 53. I thought at the time and still believe that this is the best
understanding of Parratt v. Taylor's holding that random and unauthorized injury inflicting con-
duct by an official violates due process if there is no adequate state remedy. Basically, the Court
held that either the state provides a remedy or there is a due process violation and a remedy via
a § 1983 action is available.
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process was unsuccessful. 151 My proposal was that the federal Consti-
tution requires states to compensate victims of official torts. 5 2 Those
§ 1983 plaintiffs making this claim would need to prove two elements,
a state tort and the lack of compensation. The first element would, in
turn, require proof of the elements of the relevant tort claim, not as a
§ 1983 requirement, but rather to make out the constitutional viola-
tion of an uncompensated government tort. This would not apply to
all § 1983 claims, but only in those cases in which the plaintiff is alleg-
ing the particular constitutional violation of an uncompenstated tort.
I am somewhat insecure about my conclusion that prior to Heck
the Court's program was to maintain a barrier between § 1983 con-
cepts and common law tort concepts. The dean of § 1983 scholars,
and the organizer of this Symposium, Sheldon Nahmod, argued the
opposite in an important article published in 1989.153 In a line of cases
beginning with Pierson v. Ray and including Carey v. Piphus, Paul,
Parratt, and Daniels, Professor Nahmod saw a movement away from
constitutional rhetoric and toward tort rhetoric. 54 In contrast, he
cited Monroe, Monell v. Department of Social Services,155 and Owen v.
City of Independence,156 as cases in which constitutional rhetoric
dominated. 5
7
Upon reflection, I am constrained to conclude that while I see the
tendencies that Professor Nahmod relies upon for his conclusion, I
disagree with Professor Nahmod's characterization of the cases as a
move toward tort rhetoric. Many commentators on § 1983, myself in-
cluded, have devoted themselves to attempting to expose the analytic
weaknesses in the doctrinal bases the Court has used to weaken the
§ 1983 remedy. I place Professor Nahmod's effort in that category,
and I have found the effort difficult, perhaps due to the lack of sus-
tained judicial support for the expansive view of § 1983 liability.
Professor Nahmod did point out the importance of tort concepts
in § 1983 decisions, and some decisions strongly support his conclu-
sion on the movement from constitutional to tort rhetoric. For exam-
151. Id. at 289.
152. See id. at 300-23.
153. See Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77
GEo. L.J. 1719 (1989).
154. See id. at 1725-31.
155. 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (overruling Monroe's holding that cities were not persons subject to
§ 1983 liability). Ironically, Monell also rejected the application of a plaintiff-friendly rule of tort
law, vicarious liability, in favor of a statutory and constitutionally-influenced rule that municipal-
ities are liable under § 1983 only for their own policies or customs. See id. at 691-95.
156. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
157. See Nahmod, supra note 153, at 1721-25.
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pie, he is correct that in Carey, had the Court focused on the
importance of protecting constitutional rights, or perhaps embraced
the view that confining government within constitutional limits should
be of paramount importance, it might not have so easily adopted the
common law measure of damages for § 1983 cases. 158 Instead, the
Court might have approved substantial damage awards based solely
on the loss of the right. The limitation of § 1983 damages to common
law remedies expands the domain of common law to the detriment of
constitutional values.
However, Carey does not represent a sudden invasion of tort con-
cepts into § 1983 after a substantial period of relative absence. The
genesis of the common law immunities in modern civil rights litigation
actually pre-dates Monroe and they were firmly in place before Mo-
nell or Owen. Further, Monroe itself relied on the common law for its
view of state of mind requirements for § 1983 actions. The difference
there was that the common law concept was pro-plaintiff, while in the
main the Court has adopted common law doctrines when they disfa-
vor plaintiffs, perhaps because the statute itself strongly favors plain-
tiffs. In later cases such as Paul and Parratt, Professor Nahmod
acknowledges that one might argue they "uphold[] the special status
of § 1983 as different in kind from tort law."'159 He believes, however,
that this would be wrong, and describes Paul as follows: 160
The Court first described the proposed § 1983 action as the func-
tional equivalent of a state tort action and then declared that state
remedies were adequate, sending the matter to state courts where it
belonged. The Court was not really saving § 1983 for important
cases but was rather using tort rhetoric to undermine § 1983.161
The "undermining" tort rhetoric, according to Professor
Nahmod, is not the importation of tort concepts into § 1983 actions,
but is instead the Court's presentation of state court tort suits as an
alternative that ought to be employed instead of the § 1983 action in
certain cases. In the excerpt quoted above, Professor Nahmod denies
that the Court chooses the cases that belong in state court based on
their importance, 162 and indeed many important civil rights cases are
excluded from federal court based on tort rhetoric. However, the
158. See id. at 1727.
159. Id. at 1728. See also Michael Wells, Constitutional Torts, Common Law Torts, and the
Due Process of Law, 72 Cm.-KENr L. REV. 617, 624 (1997) (In Paul "[tihe Court evidently
feared that a decision in favor of the plaintiff would destroy the boundary between common law
tort and the Constitution.")
160. This is his description of Paul but it applies just as strongly to Parratt.
161. Nahmod, supra note 153, at 1728.
162. See id.
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members of the Court appear to be attempting to formulate doctrines
for sorting between cases that they think present matters of legitimate
federal concern and cases that they find do not rise above the level of
state law torts. After all, Paul, Parratt, and Daniels are decisions on
the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment and are not about § 1983
which, until Heck, was theoretically available whenever a violation of
the Constitution was committed under color of law. The Court does,
as Nahmod argues, often view a common law tort action as an ade-
quate remedy, making a § 1983 action unnecessary. The Court has
also been careful, however, to attempt to distinguish the domain of
common law actions from the domain of constitutional remedies.
Requiring § 1983 plaintiffs to prove the elements of the most
analogous common law action is also unattractive for other effects it is
likely to have on § 1983 litigation. It creates uncertainty and is likely
to complicate litigation when the parties dispute which common law
action is most analogous to the plaintiff's claim. In Heck, for example,
Justice Souter argued that Heck's claim might be closer to the tort of
abuse of process than to malicious prosecution. 163 He also argued that
abuse of process is available "regardless of favorable termination or
want of probable cause" but is based instead on a wrongful purpose in
employing the legal process.164 One can imagine numerous epic legal
battles over whether the plaintiff in a § 1983 action must prove some
element of a common law cause of action that the plaintiff argues is
not the most closely analogous to the plaintiff's constitutional claim. 165
Rather than engaging in the argument over whether Heck is a
significant break with the past, or whether there was a movement
from Constitution to tort in the period before Heck, perhaps it is more
fruitful to reflect on what the Court has done with § 1983 over time.
Undoubtedly, there is a great deal of litigation under the statute, and
a large number of constitutional violations are presumably redressed
either by settlement or after a finding of liability in litigation. With
regard to some matters, such as exhaustion of remedies, the definition
of "under color of," and § 1983's state of mind and causation stan-
dards, the Court has allowed quite expansive liability. However, the
163. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 494-95 (1994) (Souter, J. dissenting).
164. Id. at 495 (citing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 682 illus. 1 (1977)).
165. Other issues may also arise under the Court's analysis, such as whether defendants
should be able to raise all common law defenses in § 1983 actions that would be available in the
most analogous common law action. See, e.g., Burton v. Waller, 502 F.2d 1261, 1274 (5th Cir.
1974) (holding that common law "privilege of individual police officers to fire in self defense or
to quell a riot are such common law defenses and may be asserted in response to the § 1983
cause of action to the same extent that they are relevant to the pendant Mississippi law claim").
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Court, for whatever reason, has employed a number of strategies to
narrow the reach of the § 1983 action. Many of these simply cannot
be squared with the statutory language. With regard to common law
doctrines, the Court has been selective. It has not adopted common
law elements wholesale so that a plaintiff only needs to establish the
elements of a common law action against an official in order to pre-
vail. However, when common law elements would limit plaintiffs'
ability to succeed on their claims, the Court has adopted them, most
notably in Heck, but also with regard to damages rules and the immu-
nities. The common law may merely present a convenient source of
norms to limit what the Court views as an overly broad statute.
II. COMMON LAW AND CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS PROTECTED
UNDER SECTION 1983
A. Constitutional Rights and Section 1983
Constitutional law also has significant effects on § 1983 litigation
because § 1983 functions mainly as a constitutional enforcement
mechanism. As constitutional rights expand and contract, and as the
contours of the rights change, constitutional tort litigation of necessity
changes as well. Over the past couple of decades it has seemed clear
that the Court has been motivated to narrowly define certain constitu-
tional rights by the fear that they might otherwise give rise to a flood
of litigation as constitutional tort suits.
The best example of this is the movement in procedural due pro-
cess cases from Parratt v. Taylor to Daniels v. Williams. Parratt's hold-
ing, that random and unauthorized official torts are not procedural
due process violations unless the state does not provide an adequate
remedy, may have been motivated by the desire to prevent all official
torts from becoming constitutional tort cases. But after Parratt, it ap-
peared that a great number of official torts might become due process
violations because state immunities and other doctrines might render
state remedies inadequate. When confronted with the question
whether a state remedy could be adequate even though the defendant
officials were immune from the damages remedy sought, the Court
side-stepped the issue and held that negligent infliction of injuries was
not a "deprivation" as that term is used in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This holding was clearly motivated by a desire to head off con-
stitutional tort litigation in negligence cases.
Actually, the Court sometimes seems more willing to narrow con-
stitutional provisions than the statutory provisions of § 1983. In some
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areas, the Court has resisted adding procedural requirements or re-
strictions to § 1983. For example, it has refused to require exhaustion
of state administrative or judicial remedies prior to a § 1983 suit, 16 6
and it has held that "deprivation" in § 1983 itself includes negligent
conduct, although, as noted above, it later held that negligent conduct
does not "deprive" a person of an interest protected under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 167 It is somewhat unusual for the Court to read
the same word in a statute more broadly than the constitutional provi-
sion the statute enforces; in other cases, the statutory provision is read
more narrowly than its constitutional counterpart. 168 While the Court
has not generally been shy about shaping § 1983 to meet its policies,
perhaps if it did so even more it would not find it necessary to shape
the Constitution with constitutional tort litigation in mind.
In fact, I have always found this enterprise a bit troublesome for a
variety of reasons.' 69 It seems illegitimate, perhaps even perverse, for
the Court to narrow the reach of the Constitution because Congress
has commanded an effective remedy for violations and an earlier
Court made a strong commitment to honor that command. The nar-
rowing of rights might also affect constitutional enforcement in areas
other than constitutional tort litigation. This could leave government
free to act in ways that, in the absence of the specter of constitutional
166. See Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 516 (1982); McNeese v. Board of Ed. for
Community Unit Sch. Dist. 187, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183
(1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
167. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 533-34, 543-
44 (1981).
168. I am thinking here of the federal question jurisdiction and the diversity jurisdiction,
both examples of statutory enforcement of a constitutional provision in which the identical con-
cept has been given a broader meaning by the Court in its constitutional incarnation and a nar-
rower construction in the corresponding statute. On federal question jurisdiction, compare 28
U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) with U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2; and Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nige-
ria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983), with Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). On
diversity jurisdiction, compare 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994) with U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; and State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967), with Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806).
169. 1 have, however, joined in this movement. I have argued that simple torts committed by
government officials do not normally present constitutional problems unless compensation is not
available under state law. See Beermann, supra note 53, at 284-300. I argued there that failure
to compensate is a taking and that therefore the constitutional claim did not accrue unless and
until the state refused to provide compensation. See id. at 321-23. Thus, I would institute an
exhaustion requirement for some constitutional torts-those founded on a due process violation
where the tortious conduct itself was random and unauthorized within the meaning of Parrati v.
Taylor so that a predeprivation hearing would not be required. This argument was made with
the realities of the Court's somewhat hostile attitude toward constitutional tort litigation in
mind. While I might have preferred to argue that official torts might themselves be constitu-
tional violations, I thought that this constitutional exhaustion regime was more likely to achieve
judicial acceptance and thus better than the alternative which was likely to be no claim at all
based on negligent conduct.
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tort litigation, the Court might find beyond the government's constitu-
tional power.
Michael Wells, in his article in this Symposium, makes a very in-
teresting point that constitutional tort litigation is the only situation in
which some constitutional rights are enforced. 170 For example, the
only way that excessive force in an arrest will be litigated is when the
arrestee sues the officer. The degree of force used in effecting the
arrest will not be relevant in the criminal trial the way that a search or
seizure without probable cause might affect the admissibility of evi-
dence. This means that all doctrine regarding some rights arises, of
necessity, within the context of constitutional tort doctrine. This
might relieve some of my anxiety because narrowing those rights in
light of the broad scope of § 1983 will not have negative spillover ef-
fects into other areas. However, I am not convinced. If § 1983 did not
exist, victims of official torts, as discussed above, might still sue under
state common law. Officials would defend based on their official sta-
tus and duties, and the Constitution would be employed by plaintiffs
as a reply to the defense. 171 Thus, the rights that are only relevant to
constitutional tort litigation would still be enforceable, albeit in a
slightly different procedural posture.
B. Constitutional Law and Common Law
We have seen that one strategy the Court has used to manage
constitutional tort litigation is to reshape constitutional provisions
when they are perceived as contributing to an excess in constitutional
tort litigation and liability. Insofar as constitutional law is influenced
by common law, this is another point of influence of common law on
constitutional tort litigation. From the early days of the Constitution,
courts have referred to common law for guidance in constitutional in-
terpretation.172 However, the common law connection has become in-
creasingly important in recent times, perhaps owing to the influence of
Justice Scalia on the Supreme Court.
In this Subsection, I discuss briefly a pair of developments in con-
stitutional law that have had significant impact on constitutional tort
litigation: first, the increasing reference to common law in constitu-
170. See Wells, supra note 159, at 619-23.
171. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 211 (1961) (Frankfurter, J. dissenting).
172. This should not be surprising, given roots the Constitution has in British law, where
constitutional law functions as a branch of the common law and given the common law's long
tradition and judicial pedigree. See generally William R. Casto, James Iredell and the American
Origins of Judicial Review, 27 Cor. L. REv. 329 (1995).
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tional decision-making and second, the movement away from substan-
tive due process analysis and toward stating constitutional claims,
whenever possible, in terms of particular provisions of the Bill of
Rights and not as violations of due process. This latter development
has some relationship to the common law issues that occupy this Arti-
cle but also is important enough in its own right to discuss even if it is
somewhat beyond the scope.
1. The Influence of Common Law on Constitutional Analysis
The common law has always been an important source of consti-
tutional law and the relationship between constitutional law and pre-
existing common law has always been a subject of constitutional
discourse. Common law can influence constitutional law in a variety
of ways. First, for some provisions, the common law has provided the
standards that the Court determines are constitutionally compelled.
For example, in a recent case, the Court relied heavily on the exist-
ence of a common law requirement that police officers knock and an-
nounce their purpose before breaking into a dwelling to serve a
warrant to determine that the Fourth Amendment may be violated if
officers serving warrants do not engage in that procedure. 173 Second,
the absence of a common law tradition has been cited as a source of
suspicion counting against the constitutionality of a legislative innova-
tion or against a particular reading of the Constitution.174 Third, the
common law is an important source of the liberty and property inter-
ests which gain protection under the due process clauses. Fourth, the
common law has often served as a foil against which constitutional
provisions are measured. In such cases, constitutional claims are re-
jected as stating no more than a simple common law claim. These
categories are analyzed in reverse order.
In the constitutional tort area, the relationship between common
law and the Constitution becomes somewhat more complicated be-
cause tort concepts are prevalent at the statutory and constitutional
levels. As discussed above,175 Professor Nahmod has found the inter-
action between common law and the Constitution part of a trend away
from Constitutional rhetoric and toward tort rhetoric in constitutional
tort decisions. 176 While it may be true that the Court has been much
173. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914, 1918 (1995).
174. See Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1991); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15-16
(1890); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432-50 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
175. See discussion supra notes 153-62 and accompanying text.
176. See Nahmod, supra note 153, at 1721-31.
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more attentive to the common law heritage of many claims presented
as constitutional torts, the Court's reasoning appears to be part of a
struggle to segregate the worlds of common law and constitutional
law, rather than an effort to erase the constitutional world by
recharacterizing it as part of tort law.
Although it has long been accepted that the § 1983 action is avail-
able even if there is also a state tort remedy, 177 it appears that the
Court does not find the need for the § 1983 action to be acute when
there is an effective common law remedy. 178 The Court has rejected
claims based upon reasoning that the claim would "trivialize" the
Fourteenth Amendment, turn it into a "font" of tort law that would
displace state tort law, or because it is a simple tort claim against a
state official and not a constitutional claim. The existence of a com-
mon law background that would recognize the claim counts against
recognition of the constitutional claim.
The question then becomes whether, if a state abandoned the rel-
evant branch of common law, the Court might be more receptive to
the claim. To take an example, in Paul v. Davis,179 one line of argu-
ment the Court relied upon in rejecting the claim in that case was that
it was no more than a simple defamation claim against a state official,
and such a claim should be brought under state common law, not as a
constitutional claim. The interest in one's reputation, reasoned the
Court, was but one of many that the state might protect, but was not,
in and of itself, of constitutional status.180 But, if a state abandoned its
defamation law and decided that damage to reputation no longer
stated a claim upon which relief would be granted, there would be a
serious issue as to whether a constitutionally protected liberty or
property interest remained upon which a due process claim might be
founded. 181 Without a state law basis for holding that the interest in
reputation is a protected liberty or property interest, the claim is less
viable than before. This means that the existence of a tort action
should strengthen, rather than weaken, the constitutional tort action.
177. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), overruled in part by Monell v. Depart-
ment of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
178. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), over-
ruled in part by Daniels v. Williams 474 U.S. 327 (1986). See also Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct.
807, 818 (1994) (Kennedy, J. concurring) (discussing the lessons of Parratt).
179. 424 U.S. 693, 708-10 (1976).
180. See id. at 711-12.
181. Property interests by and large arise out of state law. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 577 (1972); Beermann, supra note 53, at 301-10.
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Thinking about this issue in light of Heck leads to even more dif-
ficulty. Assuming that Heck requires that all § 1983 plaintiffs plead
and prove the closest tort law analog to the particular § 1983 claim,
what if there is no close analog, because the particular claim is un-
known to the common law? Either the Heck requirement would have
to be abandoned, or it would be relied upon to reject the § 1983 claim
on the ground that § 1983 was intended only to recognize claims simi-
lar to those recognized by the common law.
Another way in which the common law has been influential in
constitutional law is that the absence of a common law tradition for a
practice has been cited as a reason to be suspicious of the practice
when a claim of unconstitutionality is presented. 182 Stated differently,
this means that when a claim is made that a particular government
practice is unconstitutional, if the practice was accepted under the
common law, it is more likely to be upheld; and if it was unknown
under the common law, it is more likely to be struck down. 183 This is
an essentially conservative theory: placing suspicion on legislative in-
novation and privileging traditional judicial doctrine.
Perhaps the most important way that the common law and consti-
tutional law interact is the Court's reliance on the common law for a
great deal of the content of constitutional provisions. This has an ob-
vious effect on constitutional tort litigation because as constitutional
rights shift, so too do the possible bases for a constitutional tort ac-
tion. Justices Scalia and Thomas have led the Court in the movement
toward reliance on common law in constitutional cases in recent times,
although the use of common law understandings to inform constitu-
tional law dates back to the beginning of federal constitutional law. 184
The theory under which the common law is looked to as a source of
constitutional norms is similar to the reasoning that leads courts to
interpret § 1983 against a common law background. The Court is op-
182. In Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. 1 (1991), the Court held an attachment procedure
unconstitutional. One of the factors the Court relied upon was that attachment was "unknown
at common law." Id. at 16. In Chisholm v. Georgia, Justice Iredell argued strongly against inter-
preting Article III to allow suits in federal court against unconsenting states, largely on the
ground that such suits were unknown to the common law and therefore were not within the
contemplation of the framers. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 432-50 (1793) (Iredell, J. dissenting). This
view prevailed in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 US. 1 (1890).
183. Under some constitutional provisions, a longstanding common law pedigree is directly
relevant to the constitutional standard. For example, insofar as a substantive due process claim
depends on an allegation that a practice is contrary to fundamental principles underlying our
society, it is unlikely that such a claim will prevail against a longstanding common law practice,
since that common law practice must have been thought by the judges creating it to be consistent
with the fabric of society, not in fundamental conflict with it.
184. See, e.g., Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419.
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erating under the principle that certain constitutional provisions were
meant to constitutionalize common law protections of the interests
protected by the common law. 185 Thus, the common law is relied
upon as consistent with the intent of the framers.
An examination of recent cases in which the common law has
played an important role in recognizing constitutional rights casts
some doubt on the utility of the common law and also casts doubt on
how seriously the proponents of this analysis actually take the com-
mon law. On the utility of the common law, because common law
doctrines are distilled from the decisions of numerous jurisdictions
over substantial periods of time, it is often difficult to state with any
confidence what the common law actually isj186 The Court does not
look to the common law of a particular state,187 and the doubts that
the Court has expressed in another context over the existence of a
general common law separate from the decisions of particular state
courts' 88 do not deter it from attempting to create a general common
law in this context. Uncertainty over the meaning of the common law
not only contributes uncertainty to the meaning of the relevant consti-
tutional provision, it also casts doubt on the intent-based basis for
looking to the common law. If the common law was not clear, or if
there was conflict among jurisdictions, it is difficult to maintain the
argument that the framers intended that the common law provide the
basis for constitutional interpretation.
More fundamentally, the Court's behavior suggests that the com-
mon law plays more of a justificatory role than it functions as an ac-
tual source of constitutional norms. The Court, even when purporting
to apply a common law doctrine to a constitutional question, may be
unconcerned with whether its decision is actually consistent with the
common law norm. For example, in the knock and announce case
discussed above,189 the Court relied heavily on a long common law
tradition recognizing the "knock and announce" rule, as it is referred
to, in finding that the Fourth Amendment requires knock and an-
185. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 817 (1994) (Kennedy, J. concurring in the judg-
ment) (relying on absence of a common law standard to argue against a constitutional standard
for the initiation of a criminal charge).
186. See, e.g., County of Riverside v. Mclaughlin, 500 U.S. 44 (1991). Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S.
30 (1983), although a statutory case, is a great example of uncertainty over the content of the
common law.
187. As it might under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (proceedings in vindication of civil rights).
188. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
189. See Wilson v. Arkansas, 115 S. Ct. 1914 (1995), discussed supra note 173 and accompa-
nying text.
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nounce. 190 The Court, however, recognized that the common law rule
was not well-established in felonies,' 9 ' but adopted it for such cases
anyway.
The Court's "adoption" of a rule that did not really apply leaves
the appearance that the common law is not truly the source of the
norm but rather a justification for the creation of a new constitutional
right. Perhaps the common law was relied upon because that was the
only way that some members of the Court would agree with the deci-
sion. But why? Perhaps they believe that the common law is the most
legitimate source of constitutional doctrine, and while it did not actu-
ally apply to the case, at least it made them feel better because they
could deny to themselves and others that they had engaged in the bug-
aboo of judicial activism. The lack of an actual common law basis for
the rule in the case makes the reliance on the common law a falsifica-
tion, and it also makes the decision appear legally justified when, at
least on the basis put forward, it is not.
2. Substantive Due Process and Particular
Constitutional Provisions
In recent years, the Supreme Court has disfavored analyzing con-
stitutional questions under substantive due process and has favored an
approach under which claims are located, whenever possible, within a
particular provision of the Bill of Rights. This is an important devel-
opment, both for constitutional tort law and also for constitutional
theory generally.
In fact, several of the leading cases in this line in which claims
were channeled away from substantive due process and into particular
constitutional provisions have been constitutional tort cases. 92 In an
action for damages for the unnecessary shooting of a prisoner during a
prison disturbance, the Court held that the claim should be analyzed
under the Eighth Amendment and not due process.' 93 The Court
more recently held that a claim for damages based on an unfounded
criminal prosecution raised a Fourth Amendment issue rather than a
due process issue.'9 4 In the latter case, because the plaintiff's attorney
disavowed any Fourth Amendment claim, perhaps due to a mistake
190. See id. at 1916-18.
191. See id. at 1918.
192. Michael Wells' article details many of the areas in which this has occurred. See Wells,
supra note 159.
193. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1986).
194. See Albright v. Oliver, 114 S. Ct. 807, 813-14 (1994).
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over when the statute of limitations would begin running on such a
claim, the Court did not reach the merits. 195
Michael Wells' article in this Symposium is an attack on the
Court's refusal to engage in substantive due process analysis of the
sort of conduct that often leads to constitutional tort litigation.196
Courts should find cases like police brutality, excessive force, inade-
quate medical care in prison, and others, according to Wells, to raise
substantive due process issues, and courts should not force these cases
into constitutional provisions where they do not really fit. 197 Wells
argues persuasively, for example, that excessive force claims against
police officers or prison guards do not fit easily into the Fourth or
Eighth Amendments and that inadequate medical care claims do not
fit well into Eighth Amendment analysis. 198
Wells admits that in some cases his argument has little practical
significance because whatever doctrine the Court chooses, the stan-
dards and the results are likely to be the same.' 99 However, Wells
argues that in many cases, substantive due process analysis would
force the courts to look directly at what, for him, should be the key
question in a constitutional tort situation: whether there was an abuse
of power by the defendant official.200 His argument depends on the
following reasoning. There are some cases that cannot be forced into
a particular provision of the Bill of Rights. In those cases, the Court
has employed a substantive due process test that has, as its standard
for liability, that the official's conduct was arbitrary, oppressive, or an
abuse of power.
201
I agree with Wells that there is merit in using substantive due
process standards in constitutional torts cases. Official conduct that is
outrageous or substantially beyond the moral standards of society
should give rise to constitutional tort liability, and perhaps the dis-
course in constitutional tort cases would improve if the focus were on
the outrageousness of the official conduct rather than on the particu-
lars of an ill-fitting constitutional provision.202 However, I am not so
sure that it is accurate to state that the Court has held that an abuse of
government power or arbitrary or oppressive conduct violates sub-
195. See id. at 814.
196. See Wells, supra note 159.
197. See id. at 626-35.
198. See id. at 626-28.
199. See id.
200. See id. at 654.
201. See id. at 635-47, citing Collins v. Harker Heights and Daniels v. Williams.
202. See Whitman, supra note 26, at 275, discussed in Wells, supra note 159 at 650.
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stantive due process. The cases upon which Wells principally relies
are all cases in which the Court denied the claims and mentioned the
standards in terms of what would be a better claim. The Court has
expressed extreme reluctance to recognize new claims under substan-
tive due process. That leaves some room for uncertainty over what
the test would be in a case in which the Court was willing to find
liability. It may be, given the Court's resistance to constitutional tort
litigation, that an actual substantive due process standard would be
extremely difficult to meet and that plaintiffs are better off if they can
base their claims on a particular provision of the Bill of Rights.
Although the phenomenon of rejecting substantive due process
analysis is not directly related to the issue of common law influence on
§ 1983, it does have great effects on constitutional tort litigation.
However, Wells argues that the substantive due process analysis might
be heavily influenced by common law, because under substantive due
process "most common law torts, including defamation, implicate con-
stitutionally protected 'liberty."' 203 It may be, as Wells seems to be-
lieve, that more rights would be recognized if substantive due process
were the governing provision for constitutional tort litigation. I am
somewhat skeptical, however, that changing provisions would have
much effect except perhaps to disable the Court from creating the
false appearance that it is not making law in the cases in which it finds
a violation of a particular provision when, under Wells' analysis, the
claim would be better founded on substantive due process.
CONCLUSION
The influence of common law concepts has long been felt in
§ 1983 actions under the twin theories that Congress created a "spe-
cies of tort liability" and that Congress did not intend to overrule well-
established common law rules that would otherwise apply in tort liti-
gation. However, Heck v. Humphrey represents a potentially radical
break with the past in that if its analysis is applied to all § 1983 cases,
it eliminates the independent § 1983 action and makes the § 1983 rem-
edy depend upon the existence of a common law claim under the cir-
cumstances giving rise to the civil rights action. This, more than any
other development in § 1983, is a direct attack on Congress' effort to
provide a remedy where the common law may have been deficient. It
is the ultimate application of the canon of construction that statutes in
derogation of common law should be strictly construed.
203. Wells, supra note 159, at 649.
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That the common law might aid the Court in undercutting con-
gressional intent is not, in and of itself, necessarily bad, unless one
accepts the theory that congressional intent should govern in a strong
way in statutory matters. This Article has argued very strongly in
favor of the primacy of congressional intent in § 1983 actions, and in
favor of fidelity to the text of § 1983. Happily, these traditionally
strong legal arguments coincide with effective enforcement of consti-
tutional rights against government oppression,20 and stand against
misrepresenting the Court's political decisions regarding civil rights li-
ability as legal ones.
204. See Beermann, Critical Approach, supra note 4, at 92-94.
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